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The Fiscal Policy of Richard III of England
Alex Brayson
Independent Scholar
Influenced by the “new” fiscal historiographical agenda of the 1990s, this

article pioneers a radical reconstruction of the Yorkist-era royal budget. This
demonstrates that the increased role of demesne revenues managed by the royal
chamber in financing total expenditures under Edward IV, which was famously
applauded by B. P. Wolffe, signally failed to provide for long-term fiscal stability.
The removal of Edward’s French pension in 1483 led to a substantial deficit which
compelled Richard III to contravene his brother’s pledge to “live of his own”.
Richard’s sustained attempts, during 1483-4, to resurrect and revise controversial
late Lancastrian attempts to secure permanent lay taxation failed, in a general
climate of hostility to Ricardian rule. This resulted in a series of desperate royal
attempts, in 1484-5, to levy loans, and to reform the administration of the chamber
and the exchequer, prior to the early Tudor restoration of a “tax state” capable of
funding an explosion in expenditures.*

1. Introduction

It is fair to say that Richard III’s fiscal policy is not a subject that

has attracted much scholarly attention. Almost all historians of
late Yorkist government who touch upon this subject have done so
peripherally; that is to say, they draw upon the important research
of B. P. Wolffe on late fifteenth-century chamber finance as a
means of substantiating either their praise, or their criticism, of
Richard’s character.1 Wolffe drew attention to a lone surviving royal
* The writer would like to record his substantial debt to the foundational research of the
“new” fiscal historians of the 1990s; in particular their quantitatively-informed conceptualisation of pre-modern “domain” and “tax” states, which he has tried to build-upon, in
an English context, in the current article and a number of other works. He is grateful for
having shared a series of stimulating conversations with Prof. W. M. Ormrod on the Yorkist
“land revenue experiment” and the late fifteenth century transition to a “domain state”,
at King’s Manor, York, during the period 2012-13. This article of course constitutes the
writer’s own take on Yorkist royal finance, but it ought perhaps to be read alongside Prof.
Ormrod’s views offered in “The west European monarchies,” 149-5.
1 Wolffe began his career with an influential doctoral thesis, supervised by McFarlane,
entitled “The crown lands.”He subsequently published a number of1works which derived
in large part from his thesis including “The management of English royal estates,” Royal
Demesne; Crown Lands.
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chamber docket book, British Library Harleian manuscript 433,
which demonstrates the final Yorkist monarch’s vigorous adoption
of Edward IV’s policy of augmenting revenues from the crown
patrimony and accounting for these through the chamber.2 Scholars
broadly sympathetic to Richard take this information as evidence
of his commitment to adopting and improving the economical
experiment in chamber finance that many historians believe was
successfully instigated by his elder brother.3 Commentators critical
of Richard, however, point to the docket book as evidence of the
usurper’s deployment of newly-augmented demesne revenues in the
material interest of a narrow, partisan clique of Northern supporters;
thus depicting a financially foolish, as well as a quasi-“tyrannical”,
rule.4
The present contribution takes a very different approach to royal
finance during Richard III’s reign. Influenced by the “new” fiscal
historiography of R. J. Bonney and W. M. Ormrod,5 it attempts
2 Wolffe printed a number of documents from this docket book in Crown Lands, 120-39.
It ought to be pointed out that the crown patrimony is synonymous with the royal demesne;
that is to say, ancient lands belonging the crown, including those acquired at a later date
by forfeiture or gift.
3 See, for example, Kendall, Richard III, 312; Carson, Richard III, 72-3; 263-4. A more
nuanced and scholarly presentation of this argument is found in Horrox, “The government
of Richard III”, 69-70.
4 Long before Wolffe wrote, Gardiner had already drawn attention to Richard’s alleged
largesse to his Northern supporters, linking this to the supposed spoliation of crown domainal resources: Letters and Papers: Vol. 1, 159. Gardiner, tellingly, had based his observation largely on the Tudor writer Sir Thomas More’s criticism that “with large giftes
hee get him unsteadfaste friendeshippe” after Buckingham’s rebellion. This set the tone of
much later scholarship. Ross believed that Richard felt “compelled to alienate the larger
part” of his demesne resources, in 1483-4, to Northern supporters (Richard III, 178), and
that this policy “offend(ed) against deeply-held beliefs about what constituted the ‘community of the shire.’” Richard III, 122. This opinion has been echoed by many of Ross’
former students, including Dockray, Richard III, 106; and Pollard, “The tyranny of Richard
III.” 47-65.
5 Bonney and Ormrod, “Introduction,” 1-23. The “new” fiscal historiography was conceived of as an attempt to make the case for fiscal history as a discipline worthy of study
in its own right, distinct from both political and economic history. Drawing upon, and
revising, the “fiscal sociology” of J. A. Schumpeter, Bonney and Ormrod set out from two
foundational premises. Firstly, that the relative stage of development of contemporary and
historic fiscal regimes is shaped by prevalent ideological, political and economic conditions which determine, in particular, whether they are demesne-based “domain states” or
tax-based “tax states.” Secondly, and following on from this, that discerning states’ relative stage of fiscal development must involve a record-based, quantitative examination of
trends in their public income, expenditure and credit. This article constitutes a detailed
case study of the English fiscal state during the Yorkist and Ricardian eras, and ought to
be viewed in the context of Ormrod’s scholarship on the earlier growth of the medieval
English “tax state,” as discussed in the conclusion, below.
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to place the chamber’s augmentation of revenue from the crown
lands in the context of quantitative trends in the total estimated
royal budget during both the Yorkist period as a whole and, more
specifically, the reign of Richard III.6 This allows us to build upon C.
D. Ross’ suggestion that, although Edward IV’s efforts to increase
revenue from the crown patrimony were noteworthy; they did not
revolutionise the crown’s overall financial position at a time when
regular lay taxation was, as we shall see, off the political agenda.7 It
is, in fact, shown that structural fiscal problems developed during the
course of the Yorkist era, characterised by a decline in total revenues
following on from the withdrawal of Edward’s French pension, and
an upsurge in total expenditure commitments. This led Richard III, in
1483-4, to resurrect and revise the controversial Lancastrian strategy
of seeking lay taxation in an attempt to equitably fund the general
costs of government and to avoid the development of a worsening
structural deficit. Political opposition to Richard’s fiscal policy led
him, however, to change tack and try to levy large-scale credit and
to more efficiently administer the crown lands. On the one hand,
these fiscal expedients spectacularly failed to yield the cash required
to provide for the Ricardian regime’s financial needs. On the other
hand, though, the regime’s serious cash flow difficulties encouraged
it to begin to structurally revise the role of both the chamber and the
exchequer in national finance; administrative developments which
are commonly associated solely with early Tudor rather than late
Yorkist government.
2. Edward IV’s “land revenue experiment”: Yorkist
government finance
Writing of Edward IV’s achievements on his death in 1483, the
Crowland chronicle proclaimed that the late king had built up
6 For the difficulties of undertaking such an analysis for the Yorkist period and a methodological attempt to overcome these as best as possible which owes much to Ross’ work on
Yorkist finance, see below, note 14.
7 Ross, “The reign of Edward IV”, 58-60; Ross, Edward IV, 371-87. “These new methods
(i.e. the reforms centred on the chamber)”, Ross insightfully noted in Edward IV, 375-6,
“have an obvious importance as a major step towards economical reform and good business management, but their importance should not be overestimated in the context of improving the king’s revenues” (my own italics).
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a fortune in his chamber; that is to say, in his private quarters.8
Edward’s financial strength allegedly lay in his political
commitment to effectively managing previously alienated royal
lands, which had been “resumed” by his government; thus, the
Yorkist chamber instigated what Wolffe memorably called a “land
revenue experiment”.9 Historically, the exchequer, a bureaucratic
government department centred in Westminster, had managed all
royal income; including demesne revenue, much of which was lost
to the crown through its assignment at source to royal supplicants.
Under Edward IV, however, the chamber bypassed the cumbersome
exchequer; consequently, the chamber oversaw a dynamic new
regime of estate administration predicated on the appointment of
informed local surveyors, sub-receivers and auditors who personally
supervised royal lordships, farms and manors. These administrative
changes allegedly maximised the financial worth of the resumed
royal demesne; directly resulting in the crown’s net landed revenues
rising dramatically, from under £5,000 during the late Lancastrian
period, to over £20,000 at the close of Edward IV’s reign.10
Wolffe believed that the Edwardian “land revenue experiment” nearrevolutionised the crown’s financial position. Other historians have,
however, counselled against drawing this conclusion. Ross noted
that Edward’s net annual average landed revenues actually stood,
at the very least, at around half of Wolffe’s original estimate, owing
to the king’s need to financially provide for a large family.11 If we
place c. £10,000 worth of annual average landed revenues available
for public use alongside c. £30,000 worth of annual average income
from the other more or less permanent source of public income,
8 Rerum: Vol 1, 559. See also Usurpation, 70.
9 The Crowland chronicler, in the reference cited above, in note 8, stated that Edward had
“repossessed nearly all the royal estates,” “applied the whole thereof to the expenses of
the Crown” and that “these particulars… rendered him an extremely wealthy prince.” For
Wolffe’s conceptualisation of a “land revenue experiment”, see Crown Lands, 51. The following three sentences provide an overview of Wolffe’s thesis. For an account of the fiscal
politics of “resumption” see the fifth and sixth paragraphs of this section.
10 Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 188-90.
11 Ross, Edward IV, 381. One might be tempted, with some readers of Wolffe, to assume
that the figure stood somewhere in the region of £11,000, the sum total earmarked for the
royal household. Influenced by the fact that by the close of his reign Edward was apportioning around £5,000 worth of exchequer assignments from the customs and subsidies
on overseas trade to his household, Harriss has suggested a figure as low as c. £5,000:
“review:” 172. In truth, the absence of detailed memorandum from Edward IV’s reign
means that we will never know the net yield of the crown lands in the early 1480s. I have
therefore considered it prudent to suggest a sum lower than that earmarked for the royal
household, but not one as low as that proposed by Harriss, which has not been accepted by
subsequent scholars.
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indirect taxation, which by and large continued to be administered by
the exchequer,12 we are left with c. £40,000 worth of annual average
“ordinary” revenues.13 This sum falls short of total annual average
expenditure on “ordinary”; that is to say, permanent, charges.14 The
12 This figure is an average of the £25,000 per annum of revenue from the customs and
subsidies on overseas trade brought in during the early years of the reign; the roughly
£30,000 per annum of indirect tax revenue brought in during the middle years of the reign;
and the roughly £35,000 per annum of indirect tax revenue brought in towards the close of
the reign. For tabular information regarding the volume of overseas trade during the midto-late fifteenth century, see Power and Postan, “Appendix B,” 403-4.
13 It is necessary to point out that the methodological approach adopted in this article
of differentiating between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” revenues and expenditures,
which was pioneered by Harriss (in his seminal King, Parliament), has been subject to
sustained, though misplaced, scholarly criticism. Wolffe (Crown Lands, 1-28) and Lander
(Government and Community, 67) argue that, whilst contemporaries thought in terms
of “certain” and “irregular” revenues and charges, beyond this there was no identifiable
ideological framework regarding public revenue and expenditure of the kind which the
“ordinary”/“extraordinary” dichotomy suggests. I follow Harriss (“Thomas Cromwell’s
‘new principle’ of taxation:” 723, note 1) in strongly disputing these points. The later medieval parliamentary record clearly, unambiguously demonstrates that both royal officials
– in their pleading of the government’s wartime “necessity” – and parliamentarians – in
their tax concessions – recognised that public taxation ought to be reserved for specific and
temporary special expeditionary expenditures; an ideological maxim rooted in scholastic
economic thought. Historically, it was expected that the vast bulk of public expenditures
which related to permanent or “ordinary” costs, including the payment of the royal household as well as of royal officials and of standing defence costs, would be funded from the
proceeds of the crown lands. Costly additions to permanent standing charges from the late
fourteenth century, however, led MPs to relax their association of indirect taxation with
specific royal “necessities”; parliament coming to believe that demesne revenues alongside
indirect taxation would suffice in funding permanent or “ordinary” expenditures (see note
64, below).
14 The remainder of this paragraph and, more generally, this article, builds extensively
upon Ross’ approach to Yorkist royal income and expenditure. In his chapter on “The
king’s finances” in Edward IV, 372-3, Ross took exchequer expenditure statistics from
the early 1430s, which were originally published by Kirby (“The issues of the Lancastrian
exchequer:” 143-5) and applied these to the Yorkist era whose records do not themselves
allow for such an analysis. This is because, as discussed above in the text, the Edwardian
exchequer ceased to account for a large proportion of income and expenditure which was
processed instead by the royal chamber; the heart of Edward IV’s “land revenue experiment” for which accounts do not survive. Recent research (e.g. Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” esp. 132-4; 168-70) has shown that a marked increase in the volume of exchequer
re-assignments of previously abortive assignments to the permanent costs of state during
Henry VI’s troubled reign – a result of a protracted crisis in the state’s revenues – inflated
“ordinary” charges during the 1440s. Nevertheless, this did not change the fact that annual
“ordinary” expenditures on current charges remained more or less static, as inferred by
Ross (excluding diplomatic charges, which seem to have increased and became part of
the crown’s regular operations during the 1460s and 1470s, and annuities against demesne
revenues to finance patronage, which largely ceased to be an administrative consideration
following on from the chamber’s superseding of the exchequer in the receipt of revenue
from the crown patrimony, for which see below, note 15).
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crown was faced with annual average payments of c. £45,000 on
the royal household and permanent defence costs.15 An additional c.
£5-10,000 at the very least would, moreover, have been required to
fund miscellaneous charges, including increased diplomatic costs,
and the regime’s debts.16
A £10-15,000 annual average deficit between “ordinary” revenues
and expenditures would have been a problem for any fifteenthcentury English regime, but Edward was fortunate enough to have
a fiscal solution in the form of a French pension, secured in 1475
in return for the Yorkists accepting peace, which totalled £10,000
per annum.17 As Figure 1, below,18 demonstrates, the French pension
15 This sum total consisted of c. £12,000 worth of household expenditure (Myers, Household, 45 – Myers’ total must be increased by c. £2,000 as he excludes the cost of the Great
Wardrobe); c. £10,000 expended on the Calais garrison (Power, “The wool trade,” 44-5);
£4,500 expended on the East March (Storey, “The wardens of the marches:” 615); £1,875
expended on the West March (The National Archives, E 404/74/1 no. 1); c. £5,000 expended on Queen Elizabeth Woodville’s household (Myers, “Queen Elizabeth Woodville,”
253); and c. £12,000 worth of general administrative charges, including the payment of
royal officials and itinerant diplomatic charges. Royal patronage which was historically
administered via exchequer annuities on demesne revenues is, of course, excluded from
this list of expenditures. A key feature of the Yorkist “land revenue experiment” was that
the efficient, chamber-based royal administration of augmented cash income from the
crown lands would eradicate the antiquated exchequer procedure of unprofitably (from the
crown’s perspective) “farming out” key offices and estates via lifetime assignments; thus
“freeing up” more net, cash demesne revenue. It is seldom acknowledged, however, that
Edward IV’s institutional move to end the exchequer-based annuity-patronage system by
taking these charges “out” of the exchequer’s global financial machinations and bringing
in resumed demesne income through the chamber did not end the political pressure on
monarchs to apportion large sums in financing family members, as in the case of Edward
IV (see above, esp. note 11) or supporters, as in the case of Richard III (see below, section
3). Hence, net revenue from the royal demesne remained substantially lower than gross
revenue; a key point which is factored into all of the royal budgetary estimates provided
in this article.
16 It must be stressed that this is something of a conservative estimate, since the cumulative debts of the late Lancastrian regime, which had built up to an unprecedented £372,000
by 1450 when Henry VI’s government pleaded its insolvency in parliament, would have
placed a very significant annual debt repayment burden on Edward IV’s early regime; possibly well above that suggested by the figure cited above: Lander, “Council, administration
and councillors,” 192-4. Nevertheless, by the final years of his reign, Edward was said to
have paid down most of the debts racked up by his Lancastrian predecessor: Ross, Edward
IV, 380. This suggests that the annual cost of paying down dated debts would have declined
cumulatively, and probably markedly, as the Yorkist period wore on.
17 Ross, Edward IV, 233.
18 Figure 1 is based on the statistical information given in notes 11, 12, 15 and 16. Figures
2-5, in sections 3 and 5, are also constructed on the basis of detailed preceding discussions
of estimated income and expenditure.
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went a large way towards eradicating the substantial structural
imbalance in the regime’s “ordinary” finances:

Figure 1 is constructed on the premise that miscellaneous and
diplomatic costs stood at the upper end of the range cited above
(£10,000), which puts total “ordinary”, or permanent, charges at c.
£55,000. Consequently, it hypothesises a minimal deficit of c. £5,000,
which would surely have been funded either by the benevolences
intermittently contracted by the king or,19 more likely, by leftover
proceeds of clerical taxes occasionally secured in convocation.20
19 In the Middle Ages a benevolence was a financial gift offered by subjects to the crown in
lieu of military service; leviable by royal prerogative for the defence of the realm: Harriss,
“Aids:” 8-13. During the Yorkist period, however, benevolences became a means by which
the crown, which sought to avoid where possible seeking lay taxation, could tax subjects in
all but name; a development which underlay the lay community’s dissatisfaction with this
fiscal strategy. It has been pointed out that political as well as economic dissatisfaction can
be seen in the returns of Edward IV’s two benevolences of 1474 and 1481: Gray, “The first
benevolence,” 90-113; Virgoe, “The benevolence of 1481:” 25-45. Nevertheless, the timing of these two levies at times of defensive emergency, against the French and the Scots
respectively, suggests that most of their yield would have been expended legitimately on
war; a point which was probably grudgingly appreciated by contemporaries.
20 Clerical taxes, conceded and administered separately by the Northern and the Southern clergy on behalf of the crown, generally ran at either a tenth of clerical income, or a
moiety (a half tenth). The northern convocation at York conceded 7 clerical tenths during
Edward’s reign, whilst the southern convocation at Canterbury conceded 10 clerical tenths
throughout the period 1461-83; a total of seventeen tenths with an overall anticipated yield
of £50,500 (given that, by the Yorkist period, the yield of a southern tenth had fallen to c.
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Significantly, the only parliamentary lay taxes secured by Edward
were in the mid-to-late 1460s and mid-1470s; periods when Edward
IV was threatened by Lancastrian insurrection and foreign war,
respectively.21 The income being sought from these lay taxes was
therefore aimed at funding (and from what we can tell, did fund)
special expeditionary, “extraordinary”, expenditures;22 a subject
which requires some elaboration.
£14,000, and that of a northern tenth had fallen to c. £1,500). Important research on the
politics of clerical taxation demonstrates that, although historically clerical tenths were
firmly “extraordinary” subsidies, by the fifteenth century convocations were habitually
conceding these impositions almost as a matter of course; a point discussed in greater detail
and with references below, in note 67.
21 Parliament conceded 6 ¾ fifteenths and tenths during the course of Edward IV’s reign;
a 25% tax on crown tenants and annuitants, to be levied on all royal subjects holding lands,
annuities, fees or offices worth 10 marks or more, in 1464; and a 10% income tax on the
profits of all temporal lands, tenements, rents, fees, annuities, offices and pensions of all
temporal possessions, in 1472: Jurkowski, Smith and Crook, Lay Taxes, 109-20. For an
explanation of the operative later medieval lay tax system of fifteenths and tenths, and of
alternative income-based lay taxes in development during Edward IV’s reign, see below,
notes 23 and 24, respectively.
22 Ross (Edward IV, 348-9) makes much of the fact that, during 1463-5 and 1467-8,
Edward IV’s military plans to lead an army against the Scots and to lead an expedition to
France, respectively, were not successfully executed and resulted in embarrassing climbdowns. He infers that, in fiscal terms, Edward’s levying of lay supply was un-constitutional, given that public funds did not finance any actual campaign, yet this is to ignore
the very strong likelihood that lay tax revenue was still expended on military preparations.
The fact that administrative complications or a lack of political will prevented actual campaigns from coming to pass undoubtedly caused a degree of ill-will amongst MPs and
the broader lay community, but there is no reason to believe that Edward stood accused
of un-constitutional behaviour. A similar series of events occurred in 1472-5, as has been
shown by Lander, who has reconstructed Edward’s military preparations for the abortive
campaign of the mid-1470s in as much detail as possible from the surviving documentation: “The hundred years’ war,” 234-8.
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It has become fashionable to talk of the heavy burden of Edward
IV’s fifteenths and tenths23 and his experimental income taxes;24
23 Fifteenths and tenths, the standard lay tax on individuals’ moveable property in later
medieval England, grew out of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth-century parliamentary tendency to tax individuals in rural areas at a lower proportion of the value of their
goods and chattels (e.g. agricultural equipment, animals etc.) than their urban equivalents.
Early “fractional taxes” tended to assess rural dwellers at a fifteenth, whilst urban dwellers,
prior to 1332, were assessed at anything between a sixth and a twentieth: Willard, Parliamentary Taxes, 9-12. Each new parliamentary concession required a country-wide attempt
to assess and tax national moveable wealth: Willard, Parliamentary Taxes, esp. 138-47.
Institutionalised under-assessment by officials and evasion on the part of the powerful were
endemic and compromised the efficacy of the central fiscal administration: Hadwin, “The
medieval lay subsidies”: 207; Ormrod, “The crown and the English economy,” 155. This
led Edward III’s regime, in 1334, to freeze both the national yield of a fifteenth and tenth,
and the constituent sums due from individual counties, at that brought in for the fifteenth
and tenth of 1332. From this point on, every time that MPs conceded a fifteenth and tenth
officials were mandated to bring in the vill and borough totals yielded back in 1332; either
by assessing individuals at the sums their ancestors had owed in 1332, or by redistributing the burden of frozen local quotas however they saw fit within communities: Willard,
Parliamentary Taxes, 123-4; Hadwin, “The medieval lay subsidies:” 201-2. The so-called
“quota system” ensured a broadly stable national assessment, of c. £38,000 during the
first phase of the Hundred Years’ War (Ormrod, “The crown and the English economy”,
153; Ormrod, “The English government and the Black Death,” 182-5), although this had
fallen to £37,339 by Henry IV’s reign, of which only £36,398 was administrable: Abbott,
“Taxation of personal property:” 474-77. 1433 saw MPs force a national quota reduction of
£4,000, which was increased to £6,000 in 1446: Bridbury, Economic Growth, 96-7. These
developments contributed to the national quota assessment falling to £30,803 on the eve
of the Wars of the Roses, in 1449-50; of which only £27,947 was administrable: Brayson,
“The fiscal constitution,” 210. By Edward IV’s reign, the state administered a national
fifteenth and tenth quota which was valued, at most, at c. £30,000.
24 The long-term decline in the yield of a fifteenth and tenth across the late Middle Ages,
explained in note 23, above, in no small part explains the interest of Edward IV’s government in negotiating alternative lay taxes administered outside of the “quota system”. Contemporary socio-economic realities would also have driven the Edwardian regime to seek
new means of taxing lay wealth, since by the mid-fifteenth century few barons paid into
local lay tax quotas, owing to them having leased their demesnes, which meant that they
no longer owned moveable goods used in agriculture. The state therefore had an obvious
interest in devising new taxes which assessed wealth directly, not via moveable goods and
chattels, but by assessing income derived from lands, rents etc., in order to ensure that the
wealthiest landed subjects made at least some fiscal contribution. The lay taxes of 1464;
1472; and 1474 described in notes 21, above, and 25, below, ought to be viewed in this
context. Questions remain, however, regarding the conservative nature of these subsidies.
The Lancastrian regimes of Henry IV and of Henry VI had, decades earlier and in response
to similar fiscal and socio-economic considerations, also made several attempts to assess
income from lands and rents: Soos, “Direct taxation:” 157-76. Yet interestingly, as the Lancastrian period wore on, royal efforts at reforming the lay tax system were characterised
by an increasing effort to graduate payment according to ability to pay; that is to say, the
wealthiest taxpayers were charged a higher rate than the lowest, particularly in 1435 and
1450: Ross and Pugh, “The English baronage:” 1-28; Virgoe, “The parliamentary subsidy
of 1450:” 125-38. It is possible that Edward IV’s inability, or unwillingness, to emulate this
less regressive, Lancastrian approach owed to his fear, as a usurper, of alienating the most
powerful landowners, but more research is needed on this issue.
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certainly, subsidy bills such as the two and three quarters fifteenths
and tenths conceded during the long parliament of 1472-525 were
resented in the country, by gentlemen and yeoman; many of whom
will have paid significant proportions of local lay tax quotas.26 This
is understandable, given that the feudal and commercial elites were
just emerging out of a quarter century of protracted socio-economic
crisis, characterised by an intense squeeze on landed incomes and
difficult market conditions for entrepreneurs in pastoral agriculture.
Notwithstanding short-bouts of unpopular lay taxation required
to fund spikes in emergency military expenditures, however, the
political community knew that Edward had broadly honoured
his early pledge to “live of his own”, i.e. to fund his permanent,
“ordinary”, expenditures primarily from the proceeds of a welladministered royal demesne supplemented by the customs and
subsidies on overseas trade.27 This marked a crucial contrast to
Edward’s widely resented Lancastrian predecessor, Henry VI, whose
regime had doggedly attempted to secure regular lay tax grants as a
25 These were the fifteenth and tenth of 1473; and the complex subsidy of 1474, which
was intended as a hybrid between the earlier income tax of 1472 and a traditional fifteenth
and tenth, and which was to be paid primarily by individuals with little/no land who therefore did not contribute towards the 1472 income tax, and by those whose goods/chattels
were “litell or not charged” by fifteenths and tenths: Rot. Parl., 6, 113-21. The terms of the
1474 special tax back up the argument, in note 24 above, that Edward IV was particularly
reluctant to tax his wealthiest subjects and, in 1474, seemed keen on shifting as much of the
fiscal burden onto the backs of the poor as possible. When this subsidy proved to be impossible to administer, however, it was converted to one and three quarter fifteenths and tenths
in 1475: Jurksowki, Smith and Crook, Lay Taxes, 117. These subsidies ought to be viewed
in the context of the 10% income tax on profits detailed above, in note 21, which had been
conceded at the outset of the parliament of 1472-5 and yielded just over £31,000; roughly
the same as a fifteenth and tenth minus the conventional reductions for impoverished communities: Jurkowski, Smith and Crook, Lay Taxes, 113. As Lander (“The hundred years’
war,” 233) has thus stated, we should increase the royal tax take during 1472-5 to three-and
three-quarter fifteenths and tenths.
26 For a more detailed, referenced discussion of the social demographics of Yorkist lay
taxation, see the fifth section below, esp. note 124. For the opinion that Edward IV’s reign,
in general, witnessed a heavy lay tax burden, see Jurkowski, “Parliamentary and prerogative taxation”: 271-90. Jurkowski’s argument glosses over Edward IV’s placating of the
anti-lay tax fiscal prejudices of the political community drawn attention to in this section,
as well as the historically low incidence of the Yorkist lay taxes, which is discussed below,
esp. note 129.
27 Edward IV personally vowed to “live of his own” before MPs at the parliament of
1467-8: Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 146-7. In “Edward IV’s speech” (98-99), the king stated
that he would “not charge…subjects but in great and urgent causes.”
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means of funding permanent, “ordinary” expenditures and addressing
a growing deficit in the crown’s “ordinary” budget.28
Herein lay the political impetus behind Edward’s heavy reliance on
income from the crown lands. Edward was a usurper who could
not rely on unanimous or near unanimous political support from the
national and county elite.29 He therefore had to win support, outside
of the narrow clique already loyal to the Yorkist dynasty through ties
of service and patronage. One important way of doing this was by
conforming to the populist, anti-lay tax fiscal strategy, based on the
efficient royal administration of the proceeds of recently resumed
crown lands, which Edward’s deceased father, Richard, Duke of York,
had formulated with the support of parliament and the county elite in
opposition to the late Lancastrian court.30 Edward himself must have
been acutely aware of the financial “straitjacket” which this political
strategy imposed on his government.31 We see this in his creation of
the chamber-based fiscal system outlined above, which was capable
of maximising net revenue from the royal demesne. Edward’s drive
to increase revenues is also evident in the exchequer’s hard work
28 This issue is discussed in detail in the fourth section, below, since late Lancastrian
fiscal politics served as a crucial background against which Richard III and his ministers
formulated royal fiscal policy; particularly ahead of the 1484 parliament. See, also section
five, below, esp. note 131, which considers the socio-economic context of late Lancastrian
parliamentary and popular opposition to the fiscal burden of the 1430s and 1440s.
29 Edward IV’s early rule, in particular, was characterised by what Ross called a “general
desire for reconciliation”, which involved the king’s bringing of former Lancastrians into
his service and his affording the fruits of strong, but accessible, kingship to all who were
willing to accept Yorkist rule: Ross, Edward IV, 64-83 (quotation at 66).
30 For the most detailed account to date of popular and parliamentary-supported Yorkist
“opposition” calls during the 1450s for fiscal reform centred on the crown’s efficient management of resumed revenues; and of the Yorkist state’s promotion of the fiscal politics of
resumption during the 1460s, see Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 112-42; 143-79.
31 Lander memorably and far-sightedly wrote of Edward IV’s politically astute, yet in the
long term financially harmful, self-imposition of “an antiquated straitjacket of endowed
monarchy”: Conflict and Stability, 113. Lander has been accused of exaggerating the constraints of late fifteenth-century chamber finance by some scholars such as Ross (Edward
IV, 387) – perhaps ironically in Ross’ case given that it was he who initially drew attention
to the structural weaknesses of Edward’s financial position. Yet, as Lander subsequently
pointed out in defence of his initial claim, “a considerable body of evidence…exists to
confirm it”: “Introduction,” 42.
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to root out corruption in the indirect tax system; and to increase
indirect tax revenues.32
Nevertheless, as demonstrated by our quantitative overview of
trends in the Yorkist budget, the Edwardian fiscal reforms failed
to afford the government much breathing space in the event that
royal expenditures rose; or in the event that the French pension was
withdrawn. Luckily for Edward, he never had to seriously address
either of these dilemmas, which would have forced his government
to face up to financial realities in such a way which would have risked
seriously tarnishing the king’s standing; but it was inevitable that just
such a reckoning would be necessary at some point. Unfortunately
for the Yorkist state, however, two decades of the “land revenue
experiment” had created a dangerously powerful false impression
amongst the political elite that this was not simply a transitory phase
in crown finance, but rather the new norm. This notion was heavily
promoted, not only by Edward himself in his fiscal practice; but by
contemporary chroniclers and political philosophers such as C. J.
John Fortescue.33 It was therefore incredibly difficult, when serious
financial problems did emerge after Edward IV’s death, for his
successor to secure political support for a new fiscal policy which
superseded the crown lands. It is to this subject which we must now
turn.
32 Commissions were undertaken into the administration of the ports as early as the mid1460s, and the following decade witnessed the appointment of individual surveyors of the
customs and a vigorous campaign against piracy: Lander, “The administration of the Yorkist kings”, upon which Lander based his subsequent comments in “Introduction,” 42-4.
33 See the comments of the chroniclers discussed above, in notes 8 and 9. Fortescue
famously set out his ideas in De Laudibus; and Governance. As Lander has, once again,
insightfully noted, too many modern commentators have “parroted each other” as far as
Fortescue’s insistence that princes “live of their own” is concerned: Lander, Limitations,
12. A return to the two texts referenced above demonstrates that, whilst it is true that Fortescue repeated scholastic maxims long in usage (Kantorowicz, “Inalienability,” 488-502),
he also combined an unusually visceral hatred of lay taxation with a unique and unusual
theological exposition of the importance of the crown lands within English government.
The English kings, he stated, were like pious founders and their kingdom the greatest of
perpetual chantries; institutions with fixed and permanent endowments for the singing of
masses for their founders’ souls: De Laudibus, ch. 35; Governance, 113-15; 154-5; Lander,
Limitations, 12-13. Such sentiment, which seems to have been formed during the crisis of
the 1440s when Fortescue served in Lancastrian government and which he later articulated
in writing, provides clear evidence of the ideological and political pressure Edward and his
ministers were under to make the Edwardian “land revenue experiment” work.
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3. The fiscal crisis of 1483-4
The year 1483, the so-called “year of three kings”34 which saw
Edward IV’s death, the minority of his infant son Edward V and
the subsequent usurpation of the infant’s guardian and protector,
Richard, Duke of Gloucester, witnessed the development of serious
fiscal problems which demonstrate the structural weakness of the
Edwardian “land revenue experiment”. Edward IV’s ailing health
and the impression this gave, in the courts of Europe, that the
Yorkist regime was no longer a powerful force with which to be
reckoned played a key role in the French cessation, during the final
months of Edward’s reign, of the annual £10,000 French pension.35
On top of this, revenue from the customs and subsidies on overseas
trade nosedived. For much of the late Middle Ages, the two indirect
subsidies, the maltolt and tonnage and poundage, were continuously
re-granted by parliament when they ran out.36 As was custom,
however, the death of the monarch to whom these subsidies were
last conceded meant that the state had to temporarily cease their
administration.37 This meant that, for much of the exchequer year
1483-4, the regime relied solely on very light historic customary
impositions on wool and cloth. Consequently, the regime anticipated
34 This catchy phrase is the title of the fourth chapter of Breverton, Henry VII.
35 For an account of Edward’s final three years which emphasises the foreign policy
context, and foreign princes’ low opinion of the king’s diplomacy and tact, particularly in
the final months of his reign, see Ross, Edward IV, 278-95. It is worth pointing out that
even Scofield, who had a generally rosy view of Edward, was damning of his later foreign
policy; stressing the manifest weakness of the English in the view of foreign courts by
1483: Edward IV: Vol. 2, 357.
36 Ormrod, “England in the middle ages,” 32. For an explanation of these two crucial
indirect subsidies and their historic development, see below, notes 62, 63 and 64.
37 Mercers’ Company, 149, 152-4. This source demonstrates that the Ricardian regime
initially attempted to levy the trade subsidies, but that the London mercantile community
successfully lobbied against this. This contrasts with Edward IV’s success (prior to MPs’
indirect tax concessions of 1463, discussed below in note 65) in continuing to levy the
maltolt and tonnage and poundage on seizing the throne in 1461, despite these subsidies
last being conceded to Henry VI: CFR, 1461-71, 4; 6. In the politically volatile circumstances of 1483-4, the Ricardian regime clearly sought to avoid a constitutional crisis over
historic indirect subsidies universally accepted (even by Edward IV from 1463 onwards)
as dependent on MPs’ consent (for more on Richard’s efforts to avoid conflict, particularly
in parliament, at a time of unprecedented royal weakness, see the fourth and fifth sections,
below).
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total annual indirect tax revenue would fall as low as £12,000; a
decrease of just under a third.38 In a sign of the Ricardian regime’s
concern about these stagnating revenue sources, it breached custom
in enforcing the administration of the alien poll tax which MPs had
granted Edward IV in 1483.39 This, however, would have provided
the government with less than £1,000 in compensation for the steep
decline in revenues discussed above.40
It was not just that the crown’s total prospective revenue base
dramatically contracted; its expenditures also rose. When he died in
April 1483, Edward IV was planning renewed conflict with France
and was at war with Scotland.41 The political flux and instability
caused by the factionalism of the minority of Edward V and by
baronial opposition to Richard, Duke of Gloucester’s coup d’état of
June encouraged French military activities in the channel. We know
of c. £6,500 worth of government expenditures on fleets led by the
Marquis of Dorset and Sir Edward Woodville dating from May/June
38 This was based on an exchequer estimate of £12,000 provided by Longleat Miscellaneous MS book 2, a collection of royal financial memoranda edited and published by Horrox:
“Financial memoranda”: 221. These memoranda tend to be overlooked in accounts of the
politics of Richard, Duke of Gloucester’s protectorate and subsequent reign (though for
a notable exception, see Hicks, Edward V, 149-50; 152-4). What follows looks into the
financial context in which the memoranda were produced, whilst the following section
examines the broader fiscal political context, particularly the Ricardian regime’s preparations, in 1483, to ask parliament for supply.
39 This subsidy had not been administered during Edward IV’s lifetime; MPs conceded
the alien subsidy on 18 February, 1483 and Edward died on 9 April of that year, over a
month before the tax was due to be assessed and collected, on 18 May, 1483. On 1 August,
1483, Richard III issued letters patent for this subsidy to be levied by 6 June, 1484, as is
made clear by T. N. A. E 179/108/130; Jurkowski, Smith and Crook, Lay Taxes, 120.
40 No enrolled account survives for the alien subsidy of 1483, so it is impossible to say
what it yielded, however somewhere in the region of £500-£1,000 must be considered a
“ceiling” in terms of the potential revenue derived from this source. Schofield (Taxation,
73-4) has shown that the final alien tax of 1487-8, which imposed identical terms of payment to that of 1483, yielded some £774. Bearing in mind that that this later subsidy was
imposed in more stable political conditions, at a time when the Tudor dynasty was consolidating its hold on power, it seems likely that the alien subsidy of 1483 would, if anything,
have yielded less than the c. £800 brought in 3 years later, but in the spirit of trying to
demonstrate a fiscal “best case scenario” for Richard III’s reign, the following calculations,
and graphical data (in Figures 2 and 3) assume that this subsidy also yielded c. £800.
41 The following two sentences are based on Ross, Richard III, 191-2.
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1483.42 Additionally, Richard, whose background during his elder
brother’s reign was that of a Northern military commander; was
committed to continued, ongoing hostilities in the far North. A year
earlier, Richard, Duke of Gloucester had taken control of Berwick
from the Scots, which increased permanent defence expenditures by
around £5,000 per annum.43 It also fell to the government to fund the
reconstruction of Berwick, which appears to have been ruined by
warfare; this cost £2,500. As significant as these verifiable charges
are, however, it is scarcely believable that total expenditures during
Richard’s protectorship, and subsequently during the first financial
year of his reign, stood at only c. £14,000.
After he usurped the throne, Richard was compelled to raise an
armed force to suppress the Duke of Buckingham’s rebellion; to
reward the relatively narrow circle of close Northern associates
whose support in the ongoing dynastic and political conflict he
could rely on; and to fund continued conflict in the far North.
Unfortunately, it is very difficult to assign even rough figures to
these costs since Richard, like his elder brother before him, funded
important military expenditures and patronage through his chamber.44
This had significant implications, from the 1460s onwards, on the
exchequer’s management of expenditures; by the turn of the 1480s,
42 Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 220.
43 For this and the following sentence, see Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 210; 225;
229.
44 It would be quite wrong, however, to infer (as Kendall (in Richard III, 312) appears to)
that because later in his reign Richard relied heavily on chamber-based fiscal administrative expedients, more of the crown’s financial operations fall outside of the view of the
historian across the entire period 1483-5 than was the case during Edward IV’s reign. As
we shall see, Richard’s heavy reliance, from the autumn of 1484 onwards, on the chamber
occurred in particular fiscal political circumstances after the parliament of 1484. Even during this later period, however, a general assessment of the royal finances is not impossible,
as section 5, below, demonstrates. And it cannot be emphasised strongly enough that, for
Richard’s reign as a whole, the government’s financial operations are in no way less visible
under Richard than under Edward. If anything, the Ricardian regime’s finances are more
transparent than Edward IV’s, owing to Richard’s attempts to formalise both the chamber
and the exchequer’s role in government finance and the survival of record evidence regarding the loan commissions of 1485; both of which are analysed in detail in the penultimate
section below.
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the issue rolls had been discontinued.45 This means that, whilst the
Yorkist exchequer certainly retained an overall sense of total outlays
befitting a central organ of government which historically prepared
financial statements to assist governments in budgeting;46 it no longer
kept a record of termly expenditures which the historian can use in
reconstructing, however roughly, the royal budget. Nevertheless, a
general sense of the cost of Richard’s various emergency expenditures
of autumn 1483 to spring/summer 1484 can be derived through a
brief examination of historical precedent.
In the late Middle Ages, military conflicts with foreign powers
could cost anything between a few thousand pounds for a shortterm naval expedition or for a smallish land army to field against
the Scots; to tens of thousands of pounds for a large expeditionary
force to lead overseas to France. We know this principally from
royal documentation from the period prior to Edward IV’s reign,
when the exchequer accounted for all of the crown’s public revenues
and its records can be used as a reasonably reliable barometer of
expenditures. Thus, annual expenditure on some of the biggest
campaigns of the Lancastrian era, such as Agincourt or Henry VI’s
Coronation Expedition, stood in the region of £50-£100,000.47
The cost of Edward IV’s famous abortive French war of the mid1470s was likely to have been similar to that of these earlier grand
expeditions.48 These campaigns were, however, the exception not the
norm in later medieval England. Across the late Lancastrian period,
annual average special expeditionary expenditure stood at some
£20,000, but this related mainly to overseas special expeditions to
45 The disappearance of the issue rolls, from 1479, was drawn attention to by Lander,
“The administration of the Yorkist kings,” 227; 257, and has subsequently been re-iterated
by Ross, Edward IV, 375.
46 This is evidenced by the Longleat miscellaneous MS book 2, which contains royal estimates of total royal income and demonstrates attempts, by the exchequer and the council,
to match revenues to specific expenditures. For a full examination of the financial estimates provided by the Longleat MS book 2, which is placed in the fiscal political context
of 1483-4, see section 4, below, esp. note 99.
47 Harriss, “Financial policy,” 159-80; Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 76-7.
48 Lander (“The hundred years’ war,” 234-8) stresses the extremely heavy prospective
cost of this expedition, which he likens to Henry V’s Agincourt campaign in scale.
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France at a time of military crisis.49 A small force despatched to
the Northern border or a relatively minor channel fleet could, as
discussed above, cost less than £5,000.
On balance, it is likely that Richard’s expenditures against the Scots
would have been at the cheaper end of the payment scale outlined
above, although it is unlikely that he would have been able, during
the fiscal year 1483-4, to keep special expeditionary expenditures
beneath around £5,000. In this context, we know from contemporary
sources that Richard viewed the Scottish war as a priority;50 given
his prior record as Warden of the North, anything other than full
commitment to border war would have risked courting accusations
of military and political weakness by his many enemies. What
of Richard’s expenditures relating to domestic rebellion and the
rewarding of his allies during his first year as king? At the time of
Henry IV’s seizure of Richard II’s throne in 1399, Henry’s initial
invasion and subsequent campaigns against opponents and loyalists
of the old regime cost him only a few thousand pounds.51 Yet the first
Lancastrian king’s subsequent drive for loyalty apparently led him
to expend over £35,000 on his supporters. Viewed in this context,
it seems unlikely that Richard III would have been able to keep his
expenditures on suppressing rebellion and, much more importantly,
on rewarding his supporters and building up a political support-base,
49 Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 120.
50 Richard apparently threatened a “most serious war…with the very cruel and fierce
people of the Scots.” In February 1484 he planned to attack “our enemies and rebels of
Scotland:” Jones, “Richard III as a soldier,” 113-32.
51 For this and the following statement, see Given-Wilson, Henry IV, 174-89 (esp. 177).
The £35,000 figure seems to relate in no small part to the stranglehold afforded to the Percy
family, and their allies, over lucrative annuities and regional office-holding; fiscal developments which appear to have led the household to take up a dangerously large proportion
of the exchequer’s budget and seriously threaten the solvency of the state. It must be
stressed, however, that, by Given-Wilson’s own admission, actual expenditures, including
those funded via hand-to-mouth expedients outside of the conventional remit (at that time)
of the exchequer, were probably well in excess of £35,000, and may even have been as
high as £50,000.
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that far below the levels sustained by Henry IV;52 a point which
seems to be backed up by chronicle comments regarding the heavy
cost incurred by Richard in securing his throne.53
If, in order to discern the “best possible” fiscal scenario for the
Ricardian regime, we suggest that Richard did manage to keep the
cost of securing his throne from internal rivals and foreign enemies
beneath levels sketched above, his regime would still have sustained
“extraordinary” expenditures during 1483-4 of somewhere in the
region of (at the very least) £30-40,000.54 And this was on top of
52 Given the absence of much of the chamber’s records and the fact that, as noted above,
the exchequer had long since ceased to manage large chunks of the royal budget, we cannot go far beyond historically informed estimates here. It is certain that most of Richard’s
land grants to supporters totalled around £13,000; a fact derived from the surviving B. L.
Harleian M. S. 433 analysed by Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 192. When this is added on to our
conservative estimate of £5,000 worth of special expeditionary expenditure, the resultant
c. £18,000 worth of “extraordinary” expenditure definitely constitutes a vastly lower figure
than Richard’s total “extraordinary” expenditure for 1483-4, for a couple of interrelated
reasons. Firstly, as Ross (Richard III, 156) infers, it is not believable that a later medieval
usurper would only pay allies and associates £13,000 to buy and maintain their support.
This is around one third, at most, of the sum noted above which had been expended by
Henry IV in his quest to win and sustain the throne, in less dramatic circumstances than
those of 1483 which did not alienate the first Lancastrian monarch from mainstream political society in quite so striking a manner as Richard’s behaviour did the elite of southern
and midland England. Secondly, and following on from these observations, Horrox (Richard III, 310-13) points out that the abovementioned £13,000 exclusively constitutes grants
from lands seized after Buckingham’s rebellion; it excludes both grants from existing
crown lands and, crucially, from crown annuities administered within the chamber system.
It would be an impossible task, given the paucity of surviving chamber documentation, to
tally up the total cost of these latter charges, although – by way of comparison – Henry IV
expended £24,000 per annum on annuities (albeit via the old exchequer-based fiscal system) during the early 1400s: Pugh, “The magnates,” 101. It seems highly likely, then, that
in practice the Ricardian regime would have employed a large proportion of its demesne
revenues and possibly some of its broader “ordinary”/customary revenues discussed below
in rewarding allies and associates. This requires us to hypothesise that, at the very least,
emergency patronage expenditures were at least double the c. £13,000 figure cited below –
I have settled with c. £25-35,000, although the conservative nature of this estimate should
be stressed.
53 Following on from the points raised in the previous note, contemporaries stressed the
prodigious liberality of Richard during this period: Crowland, 1459-86, 160-1. According
to the Great Chronicle of London, Richard personally went before prominent London citizens to emphasise his serious cash flow problems in the wake of Buckingham’s rebellion;
the king’s aim being to secure loans on the security of the crown jewels: Great Chronicle,
235-6. The Great Chronicle’s entry is undated, though the reference to Buckingham clearly places this in late 1483 or possibly early 1484. On a similar, related, note, the heavy cost
of royal military efforts in early 1484, in Scotland as well as at sea (the king made repeated
visits to Scarborough, from whence a fleet departed in the spring) is opaquely mentioned
by Rerum: Vol. 1, 571.
54 This figure derives from a basic combination of our estimation of the cost of usurping
the throne and defending the throne against rebels in late 1483 (£25-35,000) and our estimation of the cost of fighting external enemies (£5,000).
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expanded annual permanent, or “ordinary”, expenditures of c. £5560,000.55 This constituted a minimum total annual expenditure bill
of around £85-100,000; and again, it is necessary to stress that the
actual cost of government in 1483-4 may very well have exceeded
this sum. In order to fund this level of royal expenditure, Richard
III’s regime had, on the basis of the calculations provided above,
access to some £28,000 less annual “ordinary” revenue, including
the customs (though not, as we have seen, the subsidies) on overseas
trade, than had Edward IV’s government, as a result of the contraction
in indirect tax revenues and the removal of the French pension. This
would have left Richard’s regime, during the fiscal year 1483-4, with
an “ordinary” income of as little as £22,000; a sum which constituted
around a fifth of the expenditure bill outlined above.
It seems, then, that at the outset of his reign Richard III was faced
with possibly the worst cash flow crisis of any later medieval English
monarch, yet it is necessary to point out a few important caveats.
A very significant proportion of Richard’s emergency patronage
outlays, the principal item in the “extraordinary” expenditure side of
our estimated royal budget for 1483-4, would have been funded by
a re-distribution of the lands and offices of disgraced rebels which
came into the king’s possession as a result of Buckingham’s failed
rebellion.56 If we follow Wolffe and stress that around £13,000 worth
of Richard’s “extraordinary” expenditures were financed in this way,
we ought to revise our projected total expenditure bill downwards;
55 This estimation increases the £50-55,000 worth of annual average permanent, or “ordinary”, expenditures which we have suggested characterised the reign of Edward IV by
£5,000 to take account of the regime’s need to fund the garrison of Berwick following on
from its capture.
56 What follows is based on Wolffe, who closely examined B. L. Harleian M. S. 433, fols.
282-289. Wolffe viewed Richard’s re-distribution of his enemies’ lands and offices to his
Northern supporters as one of the “most ruthless confiscations of…rebels” in the entire
late Middle Ages: Royal Demesne, 192. Building on his research, Horrox (Richard III) has
shown how the final Yorkist monarch’s patronage policy constituted a necessary, though
inevitably contentious, breach of later medieval local governance networks aimed at stabilising his regime. Others (e.g. Carpenter, The Wars of the Roses, 206-18) have emphasised,
rather more negatively, that Richard’s financial and political rewarding of his Northern
supporters presaged a more centralised early modern polity.
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to around c. £72-87,000. Additionally, as Ross has pointed out,57
the net worth of the crown lands to the royal chamber increased
during Richard III’s reign, since Richard did not have to provide
for an extended royal family as had Edward IV, meaning that he
ought to have had access to a good c. £12-15,000 more than his
elder brother from the crown lands.58 This means that net annual
demesne receipts increased from the c. £10,000 settled upon above
for Edward IV’s reign to c. £22-5,000, pushing total crown revenue
up from c. £22,800 to c. £34,800-37,800.59
Taking into consideration all of the possible minimum and maximum
royal revenue and expenditure estimates discussed above, Richard III
would have been faced with a projected fiscal deficit of somewhere
in between c. £34,200-£49,200 and c. £37,200-£52,200. Based on
these sums, Figure 2, below, postulates an average prospective
deficit of £43,200:

57 Ross, Richard III, 155.
58 Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 190-1.
59 Since, however, Richard’s emergency patronage expenditures would have been so high,
it was inevitable that (excluding the £10,000 assigned to the royal household) much – indeed probably all – of this increased revenue and income from the crown patrimony more
specifically would be needed to pay for the king’s Northern support base. Regarding payments from the crown patrimony, Richard can be shown to have alienated the lands of the
De Vere, Hungerford, Rivers, Dorset (Grey), Devon (Courtney) and the Brian and Bute
estates, all of which had been in royal hands prior to Buckingham’s rebellion. These lands
were probably collectively worth no more than a few thousand pounds: Wolffe, Royal
Demesne, 192, 193. When placed alongside the very large number of grants commented
upon by Horrox and others, however – some of which can be seen from sources such as
The Calendar of Patent Rolls but which cannot be quantified as a sum total given the absence of Yorkist chamber records – the total value of alienations from the crown’s demesne
revenues is very likely to have been astronomical. For more detail on this final point, see
above, notes 52 and 53.
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Although a £43,200 deficit was indicative of a serious cash flow
crisis, there was a potential fiscal solution for the Ricardian
government. If Richard’s regime could secure clerical taxation as
well as lay taxation, the royal government would gain access to
an income, during 1483-4, of around £7,000 and £30,000 from
these respective sources.60 These additional income sources, plus
60 This estimate of the annual yield of a clerical tax from the Southern convocation is
predicated upon such a subsidy being administered in two instalments over a two-year period, as was common practice in the fifteenth century. Since a Canterbury tenth historically
brought in c. £15,000, but by the late fifteenth century had a net yield closer to £14,000
owing to a culture of reasonably large-scale royal-mandated exemptions, it figures that
the first of two equal national instalments of a Southern tenth would yield in the region of
£7,000: Abbott, “Taxation of personal property”: 471-98; McHardy, “Clerical taxation in
fifteenth-century England,” 170. MPs, however, mandated lay fifteenths and tenths to be
administered within 1 year by the close of Edward IV’s reign; a practice which one would
assume Richard III would have sought to continue in the event that his government sought
supply. Since, as discussed above in note 23, late Lancastrian fifteenths and tenths were
valued, nationally, at around £30,000, it is reasonable to suggest that any fifteenth and tenth
sought by the Ricardian regime would also have been valued at this sum.
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parliament’s expected renewal of the subsidies on overseas trade
for the new reign which the regime would have hoped would result
in indirect tax receipts more than doubling from c. £12,000 to, say,
c. £25-30,000,61 would provide Richard’s government with around
£53,000. This figure is considerably higher than our prospective
deficit postulated above and would have allowed the regime to run
a healthy surplus.
4. Fiscal politics in 1483-4: the case for lay taxation
The foregoing attempt to reconstruct the royal budget for 1483-4
begs the question: how politically viable was it for Richard III to
move to a tax-centric fiscal policy? The king and his associates
would have been confident of securing parliament’s concession
of the maltolt62 and tonnage and poundage.63 G. L. Harriss and W.
61 Recent total indirect tax yields, in the early 1480s, had fluctuated between just over
£20,000 in 1482-3 (a year which witnessed a slump in overseas trade) and over £40,000
the previous year. The regime would have surely hoped to at least secure a yield of somewhere between £25,000 and £30,000, since this was at the lower end of annual indirect tax
income in the late 1470s. For estimated total indirect tax yields during the Yorkist period
and the late Middle Ages more generally, see Ormrod’s dataset, derived from multiplying
the value of subsidies set by parliament with published statistics regarding the volume of
trade: “Revenues to the English crown.”
62 The maltolt, so-named because of popular opposition to this supposedly “bad tax”
when it had first been levied by Edward I in 1294, was a subsidy on wool exports, over
and above the customary 6s. 8d. imposed on wool exports from 1275, which had first been
conceded by a merchant assembly in 1294 in response to royal mandated “necessities” of
the realm, specifically defensive war against the French and Scots: Harriss, “War,” 330.
Opposition to the original maltolt concessions of the 1290s owed to the lay community’s
dislike of an extra-parliamentary body conceding any secular, non-clerical tax, particularly
at a time of economic crisis: Harriss, King, Parliament, 57; 66; 69. By 1340, MPs were
seeking to concede the maltolt themselves, and the 5 remaining maltolt concessions of the
first phase of the Hundred Years’ War were made by parliament: Harriss, “War,” 331. Prior
to 1338, the maltolt charged wool exporters 20s. per sack, whilst from that date through the
1340s and 1350s the charge was set at 40s. For the remainder of the fourteenth century, the
maltolt rate stood at £2 3s. 4d. for denizen exporters and £2 10s. for alien traders, although
during the Lancastrian era denizen and alien rates began to diverge, with denizen rates
settling around 33s. 6d. for most of Henry VI’s reign, whilst alien rates fluctuated between
43s. 6d. and 53s. 6d. for most of the late Lancastrian era; in the early 1450s being raised
as high as 100s: Ormrod, “Finance and trade,” 166; Carus-Wilson and Coleman, Export
Trade, 194; 196; Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 108; 153.
63 Tonnage and poundage emerged, during the 1340s and 1350s, as a subsidy of 1s. per
tun on imported wine and of around 6d. per pound on imports and exports of general
merchandise, which was conceded by merchant assemblies in response to royal maritime
emergencies, and was specifically aimed at financing naval warfare during the first phase of
the Hundred Years’ War: Harriss, King, Parliament, 459-65. During Richard II’s reign, tonnage and poundage came to be granted by parliament, alongside MPs’ maltolt concessions.
The range of goods subject to this subsidy was increased; during the 1380s, poundage came
to be imposed, crucially, on imports of cloth by denizen merchants as well as alien traders (including, initially, Hanseatic traders). This went a little way to broaden the indirect
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M. Ormrod have shown how Edward III and Richard II had, in
the 1360s and 1380s respectively, persuaded MPs to continuously
re-grant these subsidies in order to fund expansive “ordinary”
expenditures which owed principally to the costly addition of Calais
to the crown’s permanent budget.64 These important developments
broke the umbilical cord between the maltolt and tonnage and
poundage, on the one hand, and specific “necessities” of the realm;
that is to say, defensive emergencies and the special expeditionary,
“extraordinary” expenditures to which they gave rise, on the other.
Consequently, Lancastrian parliaments had continuously re-granted
the subsidies on overseas trade on their expiry, and by Edward
IV’s time it had become customary for MPs to grant the maltolt
and tonnage and poundage for the life of the reigning monarch; the
surest sign yet that these impositions were unanimously viewed as
permanent sources of state income alongside the crown lands.65
tax base, which was disproportionately based on exports of wool: Ormrod, “Finance and
trade,” 175. Rates settled, during the fifteenth century, at 3s per imported ton for denizens
and aliens; and 12d. per pound of denizen and alien exports of general merchandise: Ormrod, “The origins of tonnage and poundage:” 226-7. During the reign of Henry VI, in the
early 1430s, a surcharge of 3s. was imposed on alien imports of sweet wine, over and above
the conventional tonnage subsidy, whilst a surcharge of 2s per pound of tin exports for
aliens was imposed, above and beyond the conventional poundage rate, in 1453: Brayson,
“The fiscal constitution,” 90; P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1453, item 8. The potential fiscal
benefits of these initiatives were, however, offset by the late Lancastrian regime’s decision,
in the late 1430s, to bow to special interest groups in the domestic and alien community and
exempt denizen merchants from poundage payments on their cloth imports and Hanseatic
merchants from all poundage payments: Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 108, note 20;
109, note 23.
64 Harriss (in King, Parliament, 471-508) shows how, after the peace of 1360, Edward
III’s regime brought financial statistics before parliament to demonstrate the need for politically regularised maltolt concessions. Ormrod, meanwhile (in “Finance and trade,”
155-86; “The origins of tonnage and poundage:” 209-27) demonstrates how the long-term
decline in wool exports from the late fourteenth century, which appears to have owed to
a combination of factors including English protectionist monetary policy; the high rate of
the maltolt; and the competition of foreign wools in the North-Western European market,
resulted in a marked decline in maltolt revenue. This prompted the crown to increase the
range of goods subject to the new subsidy of tonnage and poundage (see above, note 63),
whilst for their part MPs began to concede tonnage and poundage when it ran out, irrelevant of whether there existed a state of defensive war or not.
65 Gras, The Early English Customs System, 84. In 1463, MPs’ life grant of the maltolt
to Edward IV set the rate at 33s. 4d. per denizen wool sack exported; and 66s. 8d. per alien
wool sack exported: P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1463, item 25. In their lifetime grant of
tonnage and poundage in 1463, MPs mandated the by-now conventional rates of 3s per
imported ton for denizens and aliens; and 12d. per pound of denizen and alien exports of
general merchandise; also mandating the by-now expected surcharges of 3s. per ton of alien imports of sweet wine and 2s per pound of alien tin exports: P. R. O. M. E., parliament
of 1463, item 4. During the Yorkist period, parliament seems to have been intent on reversing the fiscal privileges accorded, since the late Lancastrian era, to denizens and Hanseatic
merchants. Thus, in their tonnage and poundage grant of 1463, MPs stipulated that all
aliens, including Hanseatic merchants, were to pay poundage; whilst no denizen exemption
was mentioned, as had been customary during Henry VI’s majority: P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1463, item 4. Edward refused, however, to accept that Hansards be deprived of
their fiscal exemption (Rot. Parl., 5, 508-9; Ross, Edward IV, 360), and it seems that both
groups continued to enjoy their fiscal privileges for the remainder of the fifteenth century.
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Clerical taxation posed slightly more problems for the Ricardian
regime. Convocation’s concession of tenths on clerical incomes
remained associated, into the fifteenth century, with specific royalmandated “necessities” during periods of war. Nevertheless, as with
indirect subsidies, the correlation between clerical taxation and shortterm “extraordinary” expenditures had been strained by a growing
deficit in the crown’s “ordinary” finances. This was brought about,
from the final decade of the fourteenth century, by a marked decline
in the overseas trade in wool, which was to continue for the remainder
of the Lancastrian period and beyond. Scholars have shown how
the regime of Henry IV sought – and was granted – regular clerical
taxes aimed, in large part, at compensating for the fall in indirect
taxation and funding permanent charges.66 As a result, subsequent
regimes seem to have secured clerical taxation almost as a matter
of course; and to a large extent dropped the ritual of pleading their
“necessity” in convocation.67 Given his politically-expedient fiscal
strategy of “living of his own”, Edward IV was in truth probably
slightly warier, yet he did secure multiple clerical tenths and it is
very likely that he expended at least some of their proceeds on the
general costs of state.68 In 1483-4 Richard III had good reason to be
hopeful, then, that he could secure a clerical subsidy.
The king’s financial hopes were vindicated, with respect both to

66 McHardy, “Clerical taxation in fifteenth-century England,” 173-4; Rogers, “Clerical
taxation under Henry IV:” 123-44. See also Harriss’ discussion (in “Budgeting,” 179-96)
of the early Lancastrian regime’s employment of clerical and lay tax revenues to fund expansive “ordinary” expenditures and ensure a balanced budget. The crown’s deployment
of lay taxation in funding enhanced permanent costs and attempting to reduce a sizeable
deficit resulted in conflict in the House, particularly in 1406, but its similar use of clerical
tax receipts does not appear to have caused any analogous upset.
67 This certainly appears to have been the case during Henry VI’s reign, during which
convocations became less liberal with their concessions, though never entirely ceased to
grant clerical tenths in the way that parliament had with lay taxes during the 1420s: Griffiths, Henry VI, 110-11; Hayes, “‘For the state and necessity of the realm,’” 105-7. For the
exchequer’s deployment of clerical supply in funding “ordinary” expenditures during the
late Lancastrian era, see Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 93, 121, 156, 171-2..
68 For convocation’s relative fiscal liberality (in comparison with the more conservative
fiscal attitude of the Commons) during Edward IV’s reign, see Keen, England in the Later
Middle Ages, 160. Keen interestingly believes that contemporaries of the 1460s and 1470s
viewed the king’s “living of his own” as being entirely consonant with securing relatively
regular clerical tenths alongside the subsidies on trade.
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indirect taxation and clerical taxation, in early 1484.69 Prospective
revenue from these subsidies, however, went nowhere near far
enough to fulfil the crown’s financial needs. It was, of course,
impossible for the crown to predict how much additional indirect tax
revenue parliament’s customary re-imposition of the trade subsidies
halfway through the exchequer year 1483-4 would yield. Yet even if
we hypothesise, very generously, that the total net yield of indirect
tax revenue brought in by the regime stood at more or less £28,000,
the same sum as the gross yield,70 and add this on to an estimated
£7,000 worth of clerical tax revenue, this only goes just over half
way to plugging the prospective deficit of £43,200 arrived at above.
The regime may perhaps have thought of seeking loans as a means
of bridging this deficit, but it is instructional that, during periods
of heavy government borrowing in the late Middle Ages, the state
contracted a large proportion of its credit base against the proceeds
of lay taxation. During Edward IV’s early years on the throne, that
monarch’s contraction of an estimated £19,000 worth of annual credit
was dependent on the defence subsidies conceded by parliament in
response to the Lancastrian threat.71 Without a fifteenth and tenth or
69 The rates set by the parliament of 1463, in its life grants of both the maltolt and tonnage
and poundage (see above, note 65) were re-affirmed by MPs in 1484: P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1484, item 4. For the clerical tenth of 1484, see CFR, 1471-1485, 278-281.

70 This gross yield is derived by adding the present writer’s analysis of trends in Yorkist
poundage revenue derived from the enrolled accounts (T. N. A. E 356/22 and T. N. A. E
356/23) on to Ormrod’s total for the customs and subsidies on overseas trade as a whole
which excludes poundage: “Revenues to the English crown”. As far as the possibility that
the regime would have brought in this entire yield over one financial year (1483-4) is
concerned, although this does seem far-fetched, it should be noted that during the worsening long-term fiscal crisis spanning the 1430s and 1440s the exchequer did bring in close
to the total gross indirect tax yield on a number of occasions in an attempt to maximise
public income and efficiently fund expenditures: Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 167-8.
Unfortunately, the inadequacies of the late Yorkist receipt rolls (no receipt roll for Michaelmas 1483-4 even exists); plus the possibility that Richard, like Edward IV, accounted for a
proportion of his indirect tax receipts directly through the chamber, prevent us from saying
any more on this matter.
71 The Corporations of London and the Staple, as well as the Italian merchant banker Ger-
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an equivalent subsidy, Richard’s regime would remain in deficit.
The politics of late fifteenth-century lay taxation were infinitely
more complex than the politics either of indirect or of clerical
supply. As discussed above, Edward IV had called for numerous
lay tax grants, though crucially, the late king had confined his fiscal
demands to periods of military crisis; either against internal enemies
in the early years of his reign or, later on in particular, against the
French. Even on these occasions, King Edward, if the parliament
roll – the regime’s official recording of parliamentary proceedings
– is to be believed, had refrained from publicly seeking supply; or
perhaps he had expounded his “necessity”, but did not want this
recorded for posterity, since it suited his purposes for lay taxation
to be seen to be off the political agenda.72 Such timidity was not an
option for Richard III. The Yorkist regime’s financial position had
declined to such an extent by 1483 that the usurper’s “ordinary”,
or permanent, outlays could not be funded by a combination of
revenues from “ordinary” and historically “extraordinary”, though
politically normalised, sources, including the crown lands, the alien
subsidy of 1483, indirect subsidies and clerical taxation; particularly
since, as we have seen, it looks as though Richard III was compelled
to deploy all but £10,000 worth of his demesne revenues (reserved
for the royal household) in funding his heavy emergency patronage
expenditures; which of course fell within the “extraordinary”
ard de Caniziani, lent very substantial sums to Edward. Overall, these three sources alone
provided the Yorkist regime, up to 1483, with somewhere in the region of £100,000. If one
considers that Edward, unlike his late Lancastrian predecessor, did not contract credit as
a matter of course every year, but only to fund special expeditionary, “extraordinary”, expenditures, then it becomes clear that the first Yorkist king could expect well over £10,000
from larger creditors alone when he sought loans: Ross, Edward IV, 378-9. Edward’s
evident creditworthiness reflects contemporaries’ faith in his ability to repay loans from the
proceeds of lay taxation, as discussed in the text. In contrast, as we shall see in section 5,
below, the comparatively limited parliamentary-controlled revenues available to Richard
III prevented him from raising more than a couple of thousands of pounds’ worth of loans
in the first fiscal year of his reign, after parliament had sat in 1484
72 See, for example, Lander’s detailed discussion (in “The hundred years’ war,” 228-30)
of the fiscal politics surrounding Edward IV’s attempts to remobilise the political community for war with France. Lander makes the point that even on this occasion, Edward’s
chancellor did not plead the regime’s “necessity” although, significantly, he appears to
have done so in a more detailed speech at St Paul’s Cathedral.
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budget.73
As a matter of fact, the Ricardian regime, in 1483-4, only had
access to some £45,800 worth of more or less customary revenues
for the funding of its “ordinary” expenditures. This constituted the
sum total of £10,000 worth of demesne income formally earmarked
for the household; c. £800 worth of estimated alien tax revenue;
c. £28,000 worth of indirect taxation, including the renewed
subsidies on overseas trade from January 1484; and £7,000 worth
of clerical supply. £45,800 stands some £10-15,000 less than our
proposed total “ordinary” expenditure bill of c. £55-60,000 for
1483-4. Now, it will be recalled that the expenditure projections
discussed in the previous section err on the lower side of potential
fiscal eventualities. Nevertheless, if they are anything to go by, then
over one third of royal expenditure commitments for 1483-4 which
remained un-funded after the sources of revenue elaborated upon
in this paragraph are factored into our hypothesised royal budget
relate to “ordinary” charges. Lay taxation was therefore required to
fund substantial “ordinary”, as well as emergency “extraordinary”,
expenditures. The serious problem faced by the king was that
“permanent”, or “peacetime”, lay taxation,74 were historic points
of tension and conflict between the crown and the lay elite. This
subject has already been touched upon in the context of Edward IV’s
“land revenue experiment”; though the broader backstory of later
medieval fiscal politics now needs to be discussed.
Parliamentary disputations regarding the role of lay taxation in
the royal budget dated back to at least the 1390s, when Richard II,
faced with the onset of a structural long-term decline in indirect tax
revenues, had claimed that lay taxation was necessary to fund the
73 The role played by emergency patronage expenditures in the royal “extraordinary”
budget at a time of earlier dynastic and political crisis, during the early years of Henry IV’s
reign, has been approached statistically by Given-Wilson: The Royal Household, 268-73.
See also Harriss, “Budgeting,” 185.
74 These terms were coined by Harriss in “Theory and practice in royal taxation:” 81112.
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permanent royal military establishment and “maintain the peace”.75
This argument caused political consternation since, as we have
seen, the elite believed that the enlarged permanent, or “ordinary”,
budget including the standing costs of defence, ought to be funded
by “ordinary” revenues supplemented by indirect tax receipts.
Nevertheless, placed under significant royal pressure, MPs had
conceded lay taxation. The situation came to a head when Richard
II, in 1397, misappropriated a plea of “necessity” – where no
defensive emergency existed – as a means of browbeating MPs to
concede further fifteenths and tenths.76 When MPs did not, initially,
co-operate, the regime threatened to withdraw pardons granted
to former political opponents; this effectively constituted fiscal
blackmail.77 Unsurprisingly, Richard’s attitude towards lay taxation
played a large role in bringing about his downfall at the hands of
Henry IV who promised to better manage the royal finances and not
ask parliament for regular lay taxation.78
The underlying structural issues regarding the crown’s financing of
enlarged permanent, or “ordinary”, expenditures did not, however,
go away. As discussed above, the early Lancastrian regime won
some respite by securing more regular clerical tenths and employing
clerical tax receipts as part of its budgeting strategy to make up for the
disparity in its “ordinary” budget.79 Nevertheless, serious problems
75 The following points derive principally from Harriss, “Theory and practice in royal
taxation:” 811-19.
76 P. R. O. M. E., parliament of September 1397, item 44.
77 P. R. O. M. E., parliament of September 1397, item 78.
78 McFarlane, “Henry IV’s government”, 78-101; Wright, “Henry IV,” 65-82. For a useful
and more recent discussion, see Harriss, Shaping the Nation, 64-6.
79 Henry V’s ability to confidently seek supply against the backdrop of a clear and evident “necessity” following on from the renewal of full-scale hostilities with France in the
1410s provided his regime with a degree of financial relief after the serious problems in the
public finances which had characterised his father’s reign. The incidence of lay taxation
rose to levels not witnessed since the mid-to-late fourteenth century (over one fifteenth and
tenth per annum, as discussed and placed in a broader socio-economic context by Ormrod, “Henry V and the English taxpayer,” 207-9). Significantly, Henry V’s regime almost
certainly deployed buoyant lay tax receipts to shore up its general financial position; particularly since extremely heavy loans contracted on the back of lay taxation, rather than lay
tax revenue itself, appears to have funded most of the special expeditionary expenditure of
the late 1410s: Harriss, “Financial policy,” 159-80, esp. 161. It is interesting that there was
no political outcry, at least not until after Henry V’s war of conquest had ended, over the
second Lancastrian monarch’s heavy and seemingly general reliance on lay taxation. This
likely owes to the political community’s relative willingness to concede heavy lay taxation
to a successful military leader who, at least in theory if not in practice, sought supply solely
for constitutionally legitimate special expeditionary expenditures; a suggestion backed up
by parliament’s immediate insistence, after the Treaty of Troyes, that lay taxation cease and
the Lancastrians’ French subjects fund any continuation of the French conflict: P. R. O. M.
E., parliament of 1421, item 25.

Quidditas 40 (2019)

167

had re-emerged by the reign of Henry VI. In the 1420s, Henry VI’s
early minority regime was just about able to fund its permanent
expenses from the crown patrimony and the customs and subsidies on
overseas trade, supplemented where necessary by clerical taxation.80
By the 1430s, however, a marked decline in indirect tax revenue,
which almost halved following on from parliament’s imposition of
the disastrous protectionist bullion ordinances of 1429-30, led to
a growing deficit between available “ordinary” revenue, including
indirect and also clerical taxation, and “ordinary” expenditure, which
steadily rose during Henry VI’s majority and resulted in a total debt
burden of £372,000 by 1450.81
In response to this growing financial crisis, successive regimes had
alternated between alluding, in parliament, to the need for permanent
80 The 1420s could hardly, however, be described as a decade of stability in the public
finances; quite the opposite was in fact the case. As Brayson (“The English parishes and
knights’ fees tax of 1428:” 653-6) has shown, a slight deficit and creeping increases in
total public debt during this decade increased the need for a new political dispensation
regarding lay taxation, even before the collapse in indirect tax revenue from 1429-30. This
was the financial context in which a novel parliamentary fiscal debate developed during
1427-8. The crown’s negotiations with MPs were centred on royal-parliamentary efforts to
construct a “new” lay tax which was less financially burdensome for the country, but which
was nevertheless capable of funding the regime’s financial outlays without requiring a
conventional fifteenth and tenth subsidy bill. In 1428, MPs opted for a subsidy on knights’
fees, which was repeated at a higher rate in 1431; both of these subsidies encountered
significant administrative problems, and the latter levy appears to have led to substantial
under-assessment and evasion on the part of elite taxpayers. These subsidies are significant, however, as they demonstrate a long-term move towards what, by 1435, emerged as
an income tax not specifically on feudal incomes, but rather on an array of incomes from
land, rents, etc.
81 For the financial problems of Henry VI’s majority government, see Harriss, Beaufort, 188; 277-91; Harriss, “Marmaduke Lumley,” 143-78; Griffiths, Henry VI, 107-27;
376-41; and now Brayson, “Deficit finance.” There has been some disagreement amongst
historians regarding the relative severity of the £372,000 debt of 1449-50. Smith (“Royal
finance,” esp. ch. 1) has argued that the operative administrative procedure by which the
later medieval exchequer managed debt (discussed below, in note 148) meant that even as
heavy a debt burden as that of 1449-50 could be managed over many years, and therefore
constituted less of an immediate financial danger than historians once thought. Other historians (see, in particular, the articles by Harriss and Brayson cited in this note, above) have
stressed that an uncontrollable cash-flow problem during the 1440s meant that a growing
fiscal deficit and a ballooning royal debt became highly politicised. This is because creditors became increasingly concerned at the regime’s likely inability to repay them any time
soon, if at all, particularly given the historically low parliamentary tax revenues characteristic of the late Lancastrian era. Viewed in this political – rather than solely administrative
– context, the £372,000 debt burden appears very serious indeed.
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supply for the wellbeing of the state; talking up the majesty of the
king and subjects’ quasi-feudal obligations to him; and finally (in
desperation) following Richard II in misappropriating a plea of
“necessity”.82 These fiscal tactics served to turn MPs and, more
broadly, the lay community against Henry VI’s regime at a time of
general political unrest and socio-economic crisis and contributed
decisively to the collapse of the Lancastrian state and to Edward
IV’s politically expedient adoption of a demesne-centric fiscal
policy which, as we have seen, was unable to provide for long-term
financial stability.83 Surveying historical precedents for so-called
permanent lay taxation in 1483-4 would not therefore have been
a pleasant exercise for the Ricardian regime. Not only was there
no historic ideological basis on which his government could seek
regular fifteenths and tenths to meet recurrent state charges, but the
82 To an extent, the late Lancastrian regime’s indecision regarding how to seek lay supply
to meet permanent, or “ordinary”, costs owes to the absence of a post-scholastic ideological argument to achieve this end prior to the late fifteenth century. Equally, however, trends
in the politics of Henry VI’s reign also played a key role; the king’s commencement of his
majority rule in the late 1430s encouraged those around the king to emphasise the prospective benefits of active royal rule in the hope that this would persuade MPs to open the
purse strings; particularly owing to the king’s apparent involvement for a brief time in the
parliamentary debating of household finance. The misappropriation of a plea of “necessity”
by the late majority regime led by William De La Pole, Marquis of Suffolk was the result
of Henry VI’s confidants’ desperation at the severity of the financial crisis which engulfed
their regime and their associated inability to fruitfully exploit earlier fiscal political tactics,
e.g. extolling Henry VI’s active kingship, in light of the king’s almost complete absence
from the politics of his own government: Brayson, “Deficit finance.”
83 It is not generally recognised that the early steps towards creating a chamber-based
fiscal system centred on the crown’s augmentation of landed revenues lay in parliamentary
fiscal debates regarding the role of the crown lands in the royal budget during the 1450s,
and in the broader fiscal administrative context of the inter-party factionalism which characterised this decade. Harriss always intended to, but never did, write on this subject (see
the comments of Griffiths, Henry VI, 835, note 92). Had he done so, it is possible that his
study would have been based around 3 inter-linked key themes examined by Brayson:
“The fiscal constitution,” 171-82. Firstly, the increased politicisation of the exchequer in
line with the policy aims, respectively, of the Lancastrian regimes of the Duke of Somerset
and Queen Margaret, and of the Yorkist administrations of Duke of York and his Neville
supporters; both of which centred on shoring up their power base. Secondly, and following on from this, the increasing difficulties encountered by exchequer officials in fulfilling
their historic, non-partisan role of maximising and efficiently administering key revenue
streams; a point which is particularly evident on analysis of the final lay subsidy of Henry
VI’s reign, that of 1453. Thirdly, attendant on both these developments, the likely deployment, by both the Lancastrian and the Yorkist regimes of the 1450s, of the chamber to
directly receive and process various revenues in line with their weak political position.
Cumulatively, these developments rendered the exchequer increasingly impotent; hence its
records are less complete from this point on.

Quidditas 40 (2019)

169

two previous monarchs who had made permanent supply a defining
political issue had gone on to lose their throne! Moreover, the
prospects of a regime which sought regular lay taxation had arguably
worsened in the third quarter of the fifteenth century as the propitious
but atypical circumstances which we have seen allowed Edward IV
to make a short-term success of his “land revenue experiment” only
served to strengthen contemporaries’ conservative attitude towards
lay taxation.
What, then, was the Ricardian strategy to overcome the substantial
fiscal political obstacles outlined above? This is not a question which
has ever really been asked by previous writers, since historians do not
generally believe that Richard III sought lay taxation; some going so
far as to unequivocally state that Richard consciously strove not to
tax his lay subjects.84 Scholars such as R. E. Horrox who make this
latter argument do so on the basis that the usurper-king remitted the
final fifteenth and tenth of his elder brother’s reign in the summer of
1483, which MPs had granted in February 1483.85 They proceed to
point out that Richard went on, early the following year, to outlaw
benevolences,86 which we have seen Edward IV had imposed with
some impunity as a means of avoiding enforcing lay subsidies. The
problem with this analysis is that it isolates these two developments
from a proper understanding of the severity of the regime’s financial
84 Ross (Richard III, 178) followed previous scholars such as Kendall (Richard III, 282)
in opining that the Ricardian regime was “unable to ask parliament for direct (lay) taxation”. This suggests that some historians (at least implicitly) appreciate the financial reality
that Richard required additional supply to fund general expenditures and bring down the
deficit; even though they ought not to have assumed that, because seeking lay supply in
such conditions contravened accepted fiscal political practice, Richard chose not to do so.
The most articulate exposition of the belief that Richard III consciously strove not to tax
his lay subjects is found in Horrox, “The government of Richard III,” 70. In this essay,
Horrox concluded that “it was a measure of his (Richard’s) success (in exploiting landed
revenues)” that he “went without parliamentary (lay) taxation,” which she describes as
a “good public relations move.” It seems somewhat strange that Horrox, who edited the
Longleat manuscript which clearly demonstrates the serious financial problems faced by
the Ricardian regime on its inception (“Financial memoranda”) in 1987, would 6 years
later explicitly endorse Wolffe’s ideas regarding the supposed financial sustainability of
the “land revenue experiment.”
85 Horrox, ‘The government of Richard III,” 70; CPR, 1476-85, 382-3.
86 P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1484, item 18; Statues of the Realm: Vol. 2, 477-98.
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difficulties in 1483-4, and more particularly from a series of specific
royal actions which are indicative of the Ricardian regime’s efforts
to secure lay taxation, to which we must now turn. It is significant
that the regime’s remittance of Edward IV’s final fifteenth and tenth
occurred on 24 June, just prior to Richard III’s usurpation on 26
June. Before his seizure of the throne Richard had been engaged,
as Lord Protector and leader of Edward V’s minority regime, in
two months’ worth of crucial fiscal planning, which has survived as
Longleat miscellaneous MS book 2.87
If taken at face value, the Longleat miscellaneous MS book 2
constitutes isolated attempts by royal officials to keep the state
solvent at a difficult time. Much of the volume outlines the regime’s
efforts to keep up payments to key charges at different points during
May and June 1483.88 Various entries are copied on multiple folios
and as a result we see rare glimpses of how the regime prioritised
certain expenditures over others. Fol. 20v. thus tells us that payments
were made to the protector’s closest ally the Duke of Buckingham
(prior to autumn 1483); which were given priority over the garrison
of Berwick.89 This provides a revealing insight into how Ricardian
87 Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 214-44. As Horrox points out at 214-15, antiquarian
scholars mistakenly assumed that this volume constituted nothing more than a cluster of
annotated customs returns.
88 The regime appears to have been particularly concerned to find a funding solution for
Berwick; an issue which a number of the folios (e.g. fol. 18v.) focus on. The funding of
Ireland (fol. 19) and the royal household (fol. 18) also appear as issues of concern. The
administration’s efforts to earmark indirect supply, clerical tax revenues and other sources
for these charges, and the political difficulties attendant upon this in terms of competition at
the exchequer (see note 89, below) serve as a microcosm of the broader financial difficulties faced by the late Yorkist government.
89 Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 231. For the exchequer warrant mandating the swift
payment of Buckingham, dated 23 May 1483, see T. N. A. E 404/78/1/4. In drawing attention to a late Yorkist warrant for payment of a key charge issued and administered
through the exchequer such as this, we can dispel lingering scholarly suggestions that the
exchequer’s historic role in warranting payments alongside receiving income, disbursing
expenditure and auditing accounts had completely broken down by this point in time. It is
true, however, that the exchequer warrants’ series for this period, as with other key classes
of exchequer record, is very patchy; the current writer’s ongoing researches on the late fifteenth-century exchequer suggest that the early 1480s witnessed a low point in its general
administrative capabilities; a result, perhaps, of Edward IV’s failure to formally codify the
respective roles of the chamber and exchequer and the resultant lack of financial administrative coordination which followed on from his death. As demonstrated in the following
section, the Ricardian regime responded to these problems by beginning to restructure the
administrative machinery of government finance.
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priorities (however necessary these may be judged to have been)
exacerbated the financial crisis which the protector inherited, since
already seriously eroded government revenues were being redirected
from the state’s expansive permanent military charges towards the
shoring up of Richard’s position as he (presumably) prepared to
usurp the throne. The most important point here, however, is not
that we can glimpse significant political dimensions to the Ricardian
regime’s running of the royal finances; but rather that this whole
exercise appears to have been part of a royal budgeting strategy
ahead of Richard’s first parliament.
This is the obvious conclusion to draw from the fact that, amongst
the financial notations discussed above, there is an estimation of
annual total royal revenues (fol. 7v.).90 The existence of fol. 7v. is
very significant because it demonstrates that officials planning (and
struggling) to match revenue streams with expenditure commitments
did so within the context of a general assessment of the crown’s
financial position which emphasised the serious insufficiency of
the crown’s total annual income. A couple of important points need
to be made at this juncture. Firstly, the Longleat book was almost
certainly a product of the exchequer and the council. A number
of the key notations, for example fol. 18v.,91 are concerned with
attempts to fund charges such as Berwick and the keeping of the
royal ships with which we know the exchequer was concerned
in the period immediately after Edward IV’s death.92 Conciliar
oversight, however, is strongly inferred by fol. 19v., which states
that (exchequer) officials can provide a full overview of the crown’s
finances whenever this is required.93 Moreover, the text is annotated
with details of events, such as when convocation was due to sit,
90 Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 220.
91 Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 229-30.
92 T. N. A. E 404/78/1/6.
93 Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 230-1. It seems reasonable to suggest that this preceded the production of fol. 7v, since the latter document is a full statement of customary
royal revenues, including the crown lands, which a royal council wishing to demonstrate
its financial weakness would have surely sought.
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demonstrating broader fiscal political planning from outside of the
exchequer.94 Detailed and coordinated financial planning by the
council with exchequer support, which has rightly been dubbed
early state budgeting, was historically undertaken ahead of speciallyprepared royal parliamentary statements aimed at impressing upon
the Commons dire problems in the royal finances and encouraging
MPs to concede the requisite additional supply.95
A fiscal political strategy along the lines sketched above had underlain
the mid-to-late fourteenth-century state’s successful demonstration
of the need for regular parliamentary re-grants of the maltolt and,
later, tonnage and poundage.96 Admittedly, royal statements of
this kind had worked less well, historically, in persuading MPs of
the need for regular lay taxation. This surely owed at least in part,
however, to the fact that such statements had less frequently been
used for this purpose. The infamous statements of 1433 and 1450
are rare exceptions, but these had provided an estimated government
balance sheet, which emphasised very heavy public debts.97 At a time
when MPs were already intensely dissatisfied with the vacillating,
often heavy-handed political attempts of Henry VI’s regime to
secure permanent lay taxation, this focus on public indebtedness
had served, counterproductively, to focus contemporaries’ minds on
Henry VI’s supposedly poor financial management and his wastage
of the royal demesne.98 There is therefore good reason to believe
94 See, for example, fol. 6: Horrox, “Financial memoranda:” 218. This anticipates the
proceeds of a clerical tax before this subsidy had been conceded, as a means of funding
Berwick and the payment of loans from the final years of Edward IV’s reign. This provides
clear empirical evidence of the extent to which clerical taxation had become politically
normalised by the Yorkist period, as discussed more generally in note 68, above.
95 See Harriss, “Budgeting,” 194-96, which summarises that writer’s earlier research
on pre-prepared royal-exchequer financial statements aimed at encouraging parliamentary
tax concessions during the fourteenth century and extends this into Lancastrian era. For
a discussion of the broader fiscal administrative context of early budgeting exercises, see
Ormrod, “Fiscality, archives,” 204.
96 See the works referenced above, in note 64.
97 For the statement of 1433, see Kirby, “The issues of the Lancastrian exchequer:” 12151. For the 1450 statement and its broader financial context, see Wolffe, Royal Demesne,
112-17, and the works cited in note 81, above.
98 The classic account is Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 97-123.
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that the Ricardian regime, in mid-summer 1483, planned to deploy
statistics to make MPs aware of the crown’s financial difficulties,
particularly the very low total income which it anticipated for the
coming year; without alienating the lay elite with politically unwise
talk of a prospective deficit or total debt.99
It follows on naturally from the points raised above that Richard III’s
regime sought to secure a fifteenth and tenth in as politically prudent
a manner as possible; the last thing the king and those around him
would have wanted was to be seen to be either mismanaging the
royal finances with talk of deficits or debts or to be misappropriating
a fifteenth and tenth granted to another monarch on the premise that
the proceeds would be expended on Edward IV’s “extraordinary”,
99 The only other potential purpose of fol. 7v., which Horrox (“Financial memoranda:”
207) favours, is that it constituted an institutionalised exchequer audit of revenue akin
to the Tudor “state of the treasury” (which was basically an annual budget produced internally within the exchequer from the first decade of the sixteenth century onwards); an
administrative practice which Horrox implies the Ricardian regime may have inherited
from Edward IV. Horrox’s interpretation is questionable on three important, inter-related
counts, which we must consider in turn. Firstly, there was not really any later medieval
tradition of such statements being produced internally by the exchequer, without a fiscal
political motive for doing so which was inevitably driven by the monarch, the council, or
usually some combination of both, at times of acute financial pressure. Take, for example, the late Lancastrian statements examined by Brayson (“Deficit finance”) and Harriss
(“Marmaduke Lumley,” esp. 167-8); these were products, respectively, of the Beaufort-led
early majority council and the De La Pole circle, which by the mid-1440s had taken on
the characteristics of a “kitchen-cabinet” in the king’s court. These case studies show that
successive regimes of the 1430s and 1440s, like their predecessors discussed in the works
cited in note 95 above, deployed the exchequer to draw upon its detailed record of public
income and/or expenditure in order to politically argue the case for a new fiscal settlement,
which by the fifteenth century equated to a demonstration of the need for lay taxation to
service the general expenditures of the crown. Secondly, and on a related note, it is counterintuitive to suggest that, at the same time when the institutional remit of the exchequer
contracted dramatically in scale and it ceased to administer a chunky part of the royal
budget, the exchequer developed institutionalised internal budgeting procedures. Viewed
in this context, it seems reasonable to propose that, at most, the Yorkist exchequer retained
at least the basics of its earlier capability to provide financial overviews at the behest of
king and council, in the later medieval manner discussed above, for parliamentary fiscal
purposes. Such a conclusion appears, in fact, to be consonant with the early research of
Lander (“The administration of the Yorkist kings”), who presented evidence to suggest that
the early-to-mid Yorkist exchequer continued to be able to provide an overview of its own
revenues for the council during periods when Edward IV was attempting to raise revenues
for his prospective French venture. These points lead on to a third, and final, criticism
of Horrox. Ironically, her suggestion that Longleat fol. 7v. was the product of a newlydeveloped internal exchequer audit is seriously undermined by her own (clearly correct,
as we have seen) recognition (on page 205 of the same work) that, taken as a whole, the
Longleat manuscript was conceived of, and produced on behalf of, the royal council (albeit
with exchequer input); not on the impetus of the exchequer acting alone.
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special expeditionary expenditures. The interpretation put forward
here would seem to be supported by the record of parliament, viewed
in the context of supplementary evidence. The Ricardian regime’s
political preparations for the parliament which sat in January 1484
can be reconstructed in greater detail than those undertaken ahead of
other later medieval parliaments because of the survival of three draft
sermons penned by Richard’s chancellor, Bishop John Russell.100 The
first two constituted his opening address to parliaments summoned
for late June and autumn 1483 but which never actually sat; whilst
Russell’s final sermon offers a more detailed examination of the
themes he discussed in his address to the January 1484 assembly,101
which is enrolled in an abbreviated format on the parliament roll.102
A strong fiscal theme ran throughout Russell’s sermons, which has
not generally been picked up on by historians.103 In the first statement,
100 Russell’s sermons have been the focus of a particularly interesting contribution by
Watts, “‘The policie in christen remes,’” 33-60. In this essay, Watts placed Bishop Russell’s focus on the need for obedience, firstly to the minority regime of Edward V and, in
his later sermons, to Richard III, in the ideological context of the Ricardian regime tapping into re-emergent classical political thought. Thus, Watts detects in Russell’s addresses
quasi-Cicerone notions of popular subjection to an efficient kingship guided by aristocratic
technocratic experts; a central theme in that writer’s belief in an emergent “Renaissance”
monarchy in the late fifteenth century. The present writer finds Watts’ analysis of Russell’s
political language, in the context of the fast-moving narrative of 1483-4, broadly compelling and indicative of a new conceptual approach to what scholars used to call the “new
monarchy”. As far as Russell’s fiscal rhetoric is concerned, however, Watts’ suggestions
seem rather less helpful: like his late Lancastrian predecessors, Russell would have been
relatively less concerned with emphasising an enlightened/well-counselled “Renaissance”
technocracy (which in the 1480s would surely have served to justify continued efforts
to strengthen Edward IV’s “land revenue experiment” rather than facilitate a return to
the “tax state”); instead, he would have been more interested in seeking fiscal-conceptual
arguments to overcome the constraints of scholastic economic theory which, as discussed
below, required a rather different public argument.
101 These three sermons are printed, with a brief introduction, by Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 167-92.
102 P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1482, item 1.
103 A notable exception is Horrox who, in her “Introduction” to the parliament roll of
1484, contradicted her own previous work (referenced in note 84, above) by correctly
suggesting that an examination of Russell’s fiscal rhetoric – both on the roll itself and in
the related preparatory sermons – demonstrates that the Ricardian regime sought supply.
Horrox is surely wrong, however, to suggest that the extent of the regime’s financial aspirations was MPs’ concession of the maltolt and tonnage and poundage. Firstly, as we have
seen, simply adding £16,000 or so onto indirect tax revenue, although welcome, went only
around a third of the way towards plugging the c. £43,200 fiscal deficit which we have
estimated the regime was confronted with in 1483-4. Clearly, this would have been a financially unsatisfactory outcome for the government. Secondly – and just as importantly – after Richard II’s government had succeeded in politically normalising the indirect subsidies,
as discussed above in note 64, above, these had come to be re-granted as a matter of course.
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Russell suggested that MPs must provide for the “maintenance of
his (i.e. the king’s) high estate as any of their predecessors have
done to any of the kings of England afore”.104 This was a deliberate
mistruth since, as demonstrated above, earlier parliaments had never
willingly accepted the need for permanent lay taxation. It seems,
however, that in arguing this case Russell sought to play upon
the young Edward V’s “tender age” and the exigencies of a royal
protectorate, which he subsequently elaborated upon,105 in order
to butter up the Commons for a new fiscal settlement regarding
lay taxation.106 Nevertheless, the obvious shakiness of Russell’s
It is true that, if a grant ran out prior to a parliament sitting or a monarch to whom a grant
had been made died, then local officials were liable to cease administering the subsidy, as
we have seen occurred in 1483. Yet the fiscal political custom had long ago emerged, by c.
1400 at the latest, that royal governments no longer needed to publicly make the case for
these subsidies to be renewed. It is, in fact, telling that when, in the 1420s, the Commons
sought to service Henry VI’s minority government’s financial needs solely by re-granting
the trade subsidies at a time when they did not accept the legitimacy of the crown’s “necessity”, the crown would not countenance adopting this as royal policy and insisted, first, in
developments in the parliamentary underwriting of credit and, second, in a return to lay
supply: Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 49-70.
104 Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 176-7. It has been suggested to me that Russell
may have been referring here to a fiscal political custom dating back to the early fourteenth
century which centred on parliament’s “goodwill” concession of lay taxation to a monarch
on his ascension to the throne. This may indeed have entered into the chancellor’s thinking,
however the way in which Russell attempted in his first planned address to depict providing for the royal estate as a binding financial obligation appears to constitute a striking
conceptual break from earlier practice (similar only, perhaps, to Richard II’s actions during
the 1390s). Even the late Lancastrian appeals, during the late 1430s and early 1440s, to the
benefits of Henry VI’s adult kingship, only encouraged MPs to concede supply; they did
not claim that supply was ideologically required.
105 The principal challenge was for Protector Richard to find a way to guide the young
monarch in his tutelage, which included helping the king choose good over false friends,
and defending the realm; much as consuls of Rome did of old for their republican leaders: Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 177. Russell’s linking of his key controversial
point, the need for supply to finance the king’s “high estate”, back to the unrelated conventional doctrine of “necessity” is significant, since it seems to demonstrate the chancellor’s
self-awareness of the conceptual weakness of the case for supply which he was planning
to bring before the political nation. This shaped Russell’s subsequent abandonment, in his
later addresses, of his earlier focus on the royal estate, and his decision instead to revise
traditional interpretations of “necessity”, as discussed below.
106 This ought to be viewed in the context of Russell’s earlier evocation of the idea that
the “hands” and “feet” of the body politic, which seem to be indicative of the nation’s
taxpayers, provide “such necessary food” as the “stomach”, which appears to be the nation’s royal government, calls for: Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 175. Here the
chancellor appears to be pivoting away from the ideological issue of political obedience
in the late fifteenth century polity, with which we have seen Watts was concerned, towards
fiscal issues; thus, in the aforementioned analogy, Russell keeps the focus on obedience,
but links it specifically to supply in such a way as to set the scene for his proposal that MPs
are obligated to maintain the king’s estate.
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case, combined with the radically changed political environment
following on from Richard’s usurpation of the throne, ensured that
this explicit and specific focus on providing for the king’s estate
was not repeated. By the time he penned his third address, Russell
instead sought to focus on and revise traditional thought regarding
the political community’s financial obligation to the state during
periods of defensive war; to the permanent financial advantage of
the crown.
A focus on the reciprocal obligations of ruler and ruled had
historically underlain medieval English parliamentary discourse,
particularly as far as wartime fiscal negotiations regarding lay
taxation were concerned.107 The crown’s representatives in
parliament were accustomed to formulaically stressing the king’s
obligation to defend his subjects from external aggressors. MPs,
acting on behalf of their constituents and the broader lay community,
were meanwhile obligated to respond to particular incidences
of royal “necessity” by providing lay taxation which catered for
the “defence of the realm”. In January 1484, as was customary,
Russell outlined the king’s crucial role of guaranteeing justice and
providing defence.108 His insistence, however, that subjects were
obligated, in response, to meet “necessary and royal” charges, was
significant.109 Russell did not refer, as had many of his predecessors,
to specific and transitory special expeditionary exigencies or
expenditures (although he unsurprisingly believed, on principle, that
“extraordinary” expenditures also required funding, as evidenced by
his elaboration of the requirements of defending the realm).110 The
chancellor’s much more general reference to “royal” outlays rather
suggests that he was talking about expenditures which were not tied
107 The following two sentences are based on Harriss, King, Parliament.
108 Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 187.
109 Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 187.
110 Thus, Russell discusses the prince’s need to “defend his land from outward hostility:”
Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 187.
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solely to special expeditionary or short-term defensive exigencies;
but rather to heavy permanent charges which it was “necessary” for
subjects to finance.111
What Russell therefore appears to have attempted, in his third
address, was to provide the crown with conceptual grounds for
seeking permanent, or near permanent, lay taxation which were
centred on the general financial needs of the state.112 As we have
seen, Henry VI’s government had made tentative moves in this
direction, but the royal fiscal overtures of the 1440s, in particular,
had demonstrated a lack of sensitivity when it came to negotiations
with the elite in parliament. Thus, the regime dominated by the
Marquis of Suffolk, William De La Pole, had proven itself all too
willing not only to fabricate a defensive “necessity” after the Truce
of Tours, but also to refuse to close parliament prior to MPs’ lay
111 This point is strengthened by placing Russell’s language in the historic context of
earlier fifteenth-century royal pleas of “necessity”. The pleas levied by the late Lancastrian government of the 1420s and 1430s still made it clear that a defensive emergency
threatened the English state and thus required MPs to concede supply, but on a number of
occasions (e.g. 1423; 1427; 1435) no specific “necessity” was expounded upon, in terms
of a detailed exposition of the nature of the military threat, as had been customary in the
past. This appears to have constituted a long-term royal effort to politically normalise a
state of “necessity;” to view this not as a transitory state brought about by, say, the Crecy
or Agincourt campaigns, or Henry VI’s Coronation Expedition, but rather as a much more
generalised state of urgent need which, in time, could perhaps begin to be viewed as including a range of permanent expenditures alongside special expeditionary costs. The constitutional context of the Treaty of Troyes had prevented this fiscal strategy from being worked
out during the late Lancastrian era, since the parliamentary and broader political tensions
attendant on any plea of “necessity” were too substantial; hence the vacillating royal fiscal political overtures of the 1430s and 1440s, which ultimately ended in Suffolk’s blatant
misappropriation of the doctrine of “necessity” during the truce of the mid-to-late 1440s,
as discussed in the following paragraph of the text, below. Edward IV’s “land revenue
experiment,” meanwhile, put paid to any such fiscal political strategy being resurrected
during the 1460s and 1470s, as we have seen. It looks, however, as though Bishop Russell
attempted not only to bring back this strategy, but to build upon it in a quite significant way
in 1484; by viewing “royal outlays,” expressed in the broadest possible sense, as constituting a “necessity” in their own right which required subjects’ concession of supply.
112 This ought to be viewed in the context of Russell’s subsequent strange elaboration of a
passage from Luke (15: 8) regarding a woman who had lost a tenth of her money-coins and
as such her wealth and overall well-being declined immeasurably. The point, the chancellor
would have his listeners believe, was that in England the res publica – the state – was similarly lacking a tenth, and consequently had gone into a sustained decline which required
addressing by the political community: Chrimes, English Constitutional Ideas, 182-3. It is
distinctly possible that this strange discourse did not constitute an allusion to the need for
fresh lay supply; but rather signified a call for the final lay tax of Edward IV’s reign, that of
1483 which we have seen had been revoked by Richard III, to be re-conceded by MPs. This
is what happened in 1487, when Henry VII requested MPs to mandate his administration of
the 1483 grant: Cavill, Parliaments of Henry VII, 60.

Quidditas 40 (2019)

178

tax concessions and to deploy public debt statistics; tactics which
coerced fifteenths and tenths but which made Suffolk susceptible
to mounting popular outcry regarding his supposed siphoning off
of public funds for private gain. These impolitic fiscal stances had
fed into a broader failure of royal management on the part of Henry
VI’s majority regime.113 By contrast, Richard III appears, despite
the state of open war in 1483-4,114 to have eschewed seeking lay
taxation on false pretences115 and/or declaring a prospective deficit
or debt as part of a heavy-handed parliamentary fiscal management
strategy.116 Instead, the Ricardian regime preferred to consensually
level with the lay elite regarding the late Yorkist state’s need for
permanent supply.
Bishop Russell’s fiscal political preparations need to be placed in
the broader context of the Ricardian regime’s management of the
parliament of 1484. It is well known that the 1484 parliament was
marked by a strikingly conciliatory royal approach to county society
which, up to a point, probably reflected Richard and his associates’
desire to heal the terrible rifts which had opened up between the
113 The now classic work on this subject is Watts, Politics of Kingship.
114 The Ricardian regime could, of course, have disingenuously sought lay supply solely,
and very specifically, in the context of the threat posed by Scotland and France, after which
it could have proceeded to deploy the proceeds on its “ordinary” and well as its “extraordinary” expenditures. The fact that it did not do so, and that Russell opted for fiscal political
transparency, is consonant with the broader collegiality with which the government approached handling the Commons, as discussed below.
115 For more detail on Richard’s government’s unwillingness to resort to heavy-handed
techniques of parliamentary fiscal management and the underlying political dynamics of
this, see the following section, below.
116 We will never know whether the Ricardian regime, after the protracted political crisis
and civil strife of the autumn period, followed through with the plan hypothesised above
and brought before the House the figures contained in Longleat fol. 7v., or some updated
version of this, and possibly details from other memoranda which are now lost to us, such
as the heavy costs of particular charges like Berwick. Nothing is enrolled to this effect on
the parliament roll, but this does not mean that the government did not bring fol. 7v. before
MPs. After the Treaty of Troyes in 1421, Henry V’s council had discussed, with statistics,
a recent decline in public revenues prior to a notable royal attempt to secure lay taxation
on the back of that king’s strong reputation, yet this statement did not find its way onto the
parliament roll. Additionally, so little found its way on to the parliament roll by the 1480s
that it is indeed possible that the roll was no longer considered an appropriate place to
record the regime’s adumbration of financial data.
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king and his Northern supporters, on the one hand, and mainstream
southern and midland political society, on the other, as a result of
the dramatic events of mid-to-late 1483.117 Nevertheless, in light of
the ongoing and grave royal financial problems, the king’s liberal
outlook ought also to be read as an attempt to butter up MPs to open
their pockets. As noted above, on specifically fiscal issues the king
sought to address the political community’s concern with Edward
IV’s imposition of benevolences by banning these forced gifts, which
were disliked by the lay elite.118 This needs to be viewed in the context
of Richard’s earlier annulment of Edward IV’s final lay subsidy,
also discussed above. More generally, Richard re-affirmed his elder
brother’s popular anti-immigrant sentiment in his advocation of a
protectionist commercial policy; the king’s motive no doubt being to
bring his supporters and enemies together against a common, alien,
economic foe.119 Moreover, Richard III demonstrated his proactive
desire to address juridical issues of concern to the landed elite.120
5. The failure of a “Renaissance” fiscal policy in Ricardian
England: deficit finance and innovation in financial
administration, 1484-5
Clearly, given the absence of a lay tax grant in 1484, the novel and
collegial fiscal political strategy planned by the Ricardian regime
since summer 1483 and adopted during Richard’s only parliament
failed to yield the desired result. MPs were ultimately unwilling to
acquiesce to what E. Isenmann has dubbed a “Renaissance” fiscal
policy; that is to say, a policy articulated by contemporary European
thinkers such as Diomede Carafa which was characterised by princes
117 What follows is based largely on the classic account by Ross, Richard III, 187-90.
118 For this sentence, and for that which follows it, see notes 85 and 86, respectively.
119 P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1484, item 27.
120 P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1484, item 20. Hanbury (“Legislation:” 95-115) eulogistically viewed King Richard’s attempt to reform the ancient enfeoffment of use as evidence
of the final Yorkist monarch’s “good intentions”, both as a man and a ruler. Ross (Richard
III, 187-9), however, has rightly corrected this Ricardian bias, viewing Richard III’s legal
reformism in terms of his need to curry political favour and appeal to a broader support
base. For the legal background, see Baker, Laws of England: Vol. VI, 654-9.
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successfully superseding the scholastic link between property taxes
and public “necessities”, or at the very least the specific “necessity”
of defensive war.121 A “Renaissance” fiscal policy instead sought to
convince the lay elite that either the majesty of the prince or, as in
Ricardian England an explosion in permanent state costs and debts,
necessitated regular direct property taxes. A key theme in continental
scholarship is that, by the third quarter of the fifteenth century at the
latest, regimes in France, Castile and Italy had successfully deployed
such arguments to instigate permanent lay taxes.122 This enabled
these tax-centric fiscal regimes to begin to contract large-scale credit
and fund an explosion in bureaucratic and military expenditures; in
stark contrast with the serious royal financial problems which we
shall see were encountered by Richard III’s regime during 1484-5.
Why, then, did the Ricardian regime, unlike its continental
equivalents, fail to persuade MPs to consent to its desired lay tax
and why, as a result, did a “Renaissance” fiscal policy not succeed
in late Yorkist England? King Richard’s fiscal political difficulties
need, firstly, to be viewed in terms of the relationship between later
medieval English lay tax structures, on the one hand, and socioeconomic developments, on the other, which had played a key role
in shaping the difficulties encountered by successive regimes noted
in the previous section in their efforts to politically normalise lay
taxation. In later medieval England – unlike on the continent, where
the elite were formally exempt from property taxes in all of the
Western European states discussed in the previous paragraph and
elsewhere – the agrarian and mercantile elite was historically subject
121 Thus, Carafa (De Regis) stated that “the resources of subjects should be regarded as
the foundation of royal power:” the exact opposite of what we have seen Fortescue argued
in England. For a more detailed analysis of Carafa and Renaissance fiscal theory, see, Isenmann, “Medieval and renaissance theories,” 21-52.
122 See, for example, the English-language papers by Henneman (“France,” 101-22);
Ladero-Quesada (“Castile”, 177-200); and Capra (“City states,” 417-442). These essays,
which were written as part of Bonney and Ormrod’s “European State Finance” project,
summarise a substantial amount of French, Spanish and Italian empirical research. For
an empirically informed analysis of the European-wide political normalisation of the role
played by property taxes within princely budgets, see Bonney, “Introduction,” 1-18, and
Bonney, “Revenues,” 423-505.
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to lay taxation.123 Although, as the post-plague crisis in seigniorial
incomes worsened during the recession of the late Lancastrian era,
there was a growing trend towards the baronage and greater gentry
securing exemptions from lay tax quota contributions, lesser gentry
and land-acquisitive yeomen played a substantial role as taxpayers,
particularly given that the poorest taxpayers were generally exempt
from payment towards local quotas.124
Recent research has shown that the lesser gentry and yeomanry
shouldered as much as three quarters of local lay tax quotas in some
regions.125 This needs to be viewed in the context of the dominant
role played by an expansive county elite – which increasingly
included not only gentry but commercially-oriented figures from
the upper reaches of a differentiated peasantry who held scores of
acres’ worth of land, married into local gentry dynasties and served
as tax collectors and jurors – in both electing, and serving as, MPs.126
123 Ormrod, “The west European monarchies,” 123-60. The subjection, to varying degrees across the country, of all social classes to lay taxation in later medieval England is
rightly emphasised in Ormrod’s article, since several prominent historians (e.g. Hilton, “Introduction,” 23-4; Given-Wilson, “The problem of labour,” 96-7) wrongly assumed that,
because the provincial elite oversaw the manner in which local fifteenth and tenth quotas
were distributed after the state’s freezing of local quotas in 1334, county notables must
have given themselves a blanket fiscal exemption. As Ormrod points out, the exchequer
evidence examined by Willard (Parliamentary Taxes), supplemented by more recent research by Ormrod (“Poverty and privilege,” 637-56), Dyer (“Taxation and communities”,
168-90) and others, demonstrates beyond any doubt that the nobility continued to pay lay
taxation, to varying degrees throughout the country, into the fifteenth century and in some
cases well beyond.
124 Regarding the historic fiscal exemption afforded to the poor; during the fourteenth
century this was formally accorded to those in the countryside who held goods/chattels
valued at less than 10s.; and to those in urban areas who held goods/chattels worth less
than 6s.: Willard, Parliamentary Taxes, 87-92. For the “informal” continuation of povertybased fiscal exemptions into the fifteenth century, see Ormrod, “Poverty and privilege,”
638-47. The point made above regarding the increasing fiscal privilege accorded to barons,
and more generally the discussion in the following paragraph, largely derives from an unpublished article by the present writer, which builds upon the conclusions of Dyer and others such as Forrest (“The distribution of medieval taxation,” 27-47) who have worked on
rare detailed surviving lay tax assessments compiled by local officials prior to the central
administration’s enrolment of the formulaic royal assessments kept by the exchequer and
catalogued in the T. N. A. E 179 series.
125 Dyer, “Taxation and communities,” 180-1.
126 McKisack, Parliamentary Representation, 106-10; Horrox, “The urban gentry,”
22-44.
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Clearly, these demographics were not going to be easily persuaded
– whatever the ideological basis of the crown’s fiscal rhetoric –
to consent to regular lay taxes which they, to a significant extent,
contributed towards; a point made all the more relevant when we
consider the improving material position of a growing number
of mid-to-late fifteenth-century gentlemen and yeomen. It is well
known that, from the mid-fifteenth century onwards, entrepreneurs
from these demographics had begun to enclose land; to exploit a
growing landless proletariat; and to profit from competitively vended
market produce.127
So-called agrarian commercialisation has been viewed by R. H.
Britnell, C. C. Dyer, E. B. Fryde and R. H. Hilton, amongst others,
in the context of an upturn in prices, and wages beginning to drop
from their mid-century high point; market conditions favourable
to commercially-minded farmers’ investment in fixed and variable
capital.128 It seems likely, however, that the relatively low lay tax
burden, by historical standards at least, of the reign of Edward IV129
also helped to encourage the commercial activities of an emergent
127 For a summary and analysis of the prodigious literature on these structural socioeconomic changes from different historiographical perspectives, see Dimmock, Origin,
and Bailey, Decline. Ongoing scholarly disagreement centres not on whether agrarian commercialisation, sometimes dubbed “proto-capitalism” by those writing in – or influenced
by – the Marxian tradition, occurred from the late fifteenth century, since almost all modern
historians of the later medieval and early modern eras accept the weight of empirical evidence which demonstrates structural changes in agrarian production and social relations
during this period. Rather, historians disagree on whether the aristocratic elite was the key
actor in the commercialisation of agriculture, in its political decision to lease demesne land,
as Brenner famously argued was the case (in “Agrarian class structure,” 10-63). Similarly,
historians remain divided on the scale of socio-economic change by the close of the fifteenth century, although in more recent years a consensus seems to have emerged which
suggests that southern and midland England witnessed a fairly advanced degree of “capitalisation,” at least in comparison with the highland North.
128 See, for example, Britnell, Closing, 208-47; Britnell, Commercialisation, 102-27;
Dyer, Transition?, 126-72; Fryde, Peasants and Landlords, 256-78; Hilton, Economic Development, 115-30; 131-48; Hilton, “Rent and capital formation,” 174-214.
129 The fifteenths and tenths conceded by parliament throughout Edward IV’s reign, discussed above in note 21, ran at an annual average of 0.3 during the 1460s, 1470s and early
1480s. Since 1 fifteenth and tenth has been shown to tap into just over 1% of estimated GDP
in later medieval England (Ormrod, “Fiscality, archives,” 218), the fractional lay taxes of
Edward IV’s reign would have brought in just over a quarter of 1% of domestic product; a
lower tax-take figure than for any of the earlier later medieval English monarchs.

Quidditas 40 (2019)

183

agrarian bourgeoisie.130 Not having to worry too much about funding
“non-productive” fifteenth and tenth outlays, as their antecedents of
the 1430s and 1440s had during the long recession,131 meant that
pastoral farming enterprises could viably look to burgeoning credit
markets to fund “productive”, market-oriented, capital investment
which underlay qualitative economic growth. Up to a point, then, it
mattered little who sat on the throne during 1483-5: any king would
have struggled to reverse the political consensus in favour of the
Yorkist “land revenue experiment”.
Nevertheless, there are strong reasons to believe Richard III’s
dangerously low standing with what Ross calls the traditional
“community of the shire” in the south and midlands of the
country132 negatively impacted on the fiscal political prospects of
his government in such a way that would not have been the case
had another monarch sat on the throne. Many in these areas already
resented Richard for his ongoing importation of a small clique
of Northern supporters into key local lands and offices, which a
strong trend in revisionist scholarship exemplified by the work of
Horrox views in terms of Richard’s need to bypass a traditional
local Establishment which was overwhelmingly hostile to his rule
and could not be trusted.133 Given that the gentry and yeomanry of
130 This point has been made in a couple of important regional studies (Allen, Enclosure;
Whittle, Development, esp. ch. 4), but it has yet to be extended to national studies of socioeconomic change (see, however, the noteworthy comments of Parker, Ideology, 51-2).
131The fiscal burden had been a pressing economic problem during the second quarter
of the fifteenth century, when lay taxation ran at an annual average half a fifteenth and
tenth; 0.5% of GDP. When viewed in the context of the record high wages and low market
prices which had characterised this era, this slightly higher lay tax take, in comparison
with that cited above, in note 129 for the Yorkist period, played a decisive role in stalling
economic and commercial growth, as merchants were unconvinced of the relative ability
of agrarian businessmen to yield enough profit from competitive trade to pay down debts
levied to fund “productive” capital improvements as well as “unproductive” fiscal outlays.
Many agrarian enterprises consequently stalled, as credit dried out; yeoman profits fell;
and yeomen were consequently unable to fund competitive rents, which took on a renewed
customary character: Dimmock, Origin, 93; Dyer, Transition?, 201-2. These developments
to a large extent underpinned the growing anti-lay tax fiscal politics of the late Lancastrian
era traced above, in section 4.
132 Ross, Richard III, 122; see also Pollard, “The tyranny of Richard III:” 47-65.
133 Horrox, Richard III.
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southern-central England, which constituted a sizeable proportion of
the Commons, contributed heavily towards both local fifteenth and
tenth quotas as discussed above and towards the national fifteenth
and tenth quota owing to the proportionately lower sums contributed
by the Northern counties,134 these demographics would have further
resented Richard for his efforts to impose a lay tax.
The key point here is that, had Richard III commanded the confidence
of the southern and midland elite, as K. B. McFarlane taught us
all later medieval English monarchs other than the mentally unable
(e.g. Henry VI during his late majority) and usurpers such as
Richard himself did,135 there is at least a chance that he could have
successfully overcome economically-conditioned parliamentary
fiscal opposition, by persuading MPs that more regular lay taxes were
a worthwhile trade-off for increased socio-political stability. This is
more or less what occurred under the early Tudors. Henry VII and
Henry VIII took advantage of the increased political stability after
the Wars of the Roses to negotiate more regular fifteenths and tenths
and income taxes, which were increasingly dissociated from, or only
loosely related to, defensive “necessities”;136 fiscal policy outcomes
134 Abbott, “Taxation of personal property:” 471-98.
135 See, for example, McFarlane, “Bastard feudalism:” 161-80. Usurpers inevitably faced
political opposition owing to the fact that they were not universally accepted as legitimate
monarchs, as Henry IV’s problems with the Percy family, Edward IV’s problems with
the De Veres and other supporters of Henry VI and his queen Margaret of Anjou, not to
mention the Tudors’ later problems with the De La Pole dynasty, all demonstrate. Strong
royal direction of political society was, however, generally enough to isolate these rebels
and ensure the failure of their seditious activities, particularly by the late fifteenth century,
when the “new monarchy” had begun to refashion county networks around its relationship
with royal appointed “new men” and more conventional magnates and gentry had, in any
case, tired of civil strife, irrelevant of their prior dynastic loyalties. The scale and potency
of opposition to Richard III was, of course, far greater, owing to that monarch’s widely
suspected commitment of regicide.
136 Henry VII was granted 8 fifteenths and tenths (including the subsidy of March 1497,
which was administered as 2 fifteenths and tenths and served to double the 2 fifteenths and
tenths already conceded by that parliament; and the subsidy of 1504 which was conceded
in lieu of 2 feudal aids, and was also administered as a fifteenth and tenth); as well as an income tax of 10% in 1489 on both the commons and the lords. A number of these subsidies
were formally conceded in response to the early Tudor regime’s allusion to the demands
of defence, which was framed in the context of a more general royal need; thus obviously
drawing on Bishop Russell’s address of 1483-4 (see, for example, P. R. O. M. E., parliament of 1489, item 1, where the chancellor, Bishop Morton, alluded to subjects’ need to
protect their king and also to render obedience to the state). Underlying early Tudor fiscal
politics, it is therefore possible to detect a growing consensus around the state’s need for lay
taxation which could no longer viably be restricted to particular incidences of short-term
defensive warfare (as pointed out by Grummitt who insightfully stated that during Henry
VII’s reign “the allusion that late medieval (fiscal) practice was being followed stopped”,
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which both Henry VI and Richard III had earlier, unsuccessfully,
sought. Meanwhile, the exchequer’s likely acceptance of increased
levels of fiscal exemption for local elites from the 1490s onwards
helped to facilitate a parliamentary consensus in favour of a higher
incidence of fifteenths and tenths.137 The yield of the early Tudor
lay taxes, viewed in the context of increased indirect tax revenues
and strong management of demesne lands, meant that a financially
stable regime could fund expenditures in excess of £1 million.138
It was not politically possible, however, for Richard III to anticipate
Tudor fiscal successes. Beyond effectively implanting Ricardian
ally William Catesby as Speaker of the House, there is no direct
evidence to suggest that the regime packed the Commons with its
own supporters.139 This is consonant with the royal concessions,
drawn attention to above, to MPs in 1484; it seems that the king
sought to be seen, by those who were naturally hostile to his rule,
as far as the regime’s handling of different categories of revenue was concerned: “Henry
VII:” 234). These developments preceded Henry VIII’s largely successful attempts, drawn
attention to by Elton (in “Taxation for war and peace,” 33-48), to secure lay taxation to
fund standing defence costs relating to the keeping of the seas and Calais during the 1530s.
Harriss (in “Thomas Cromwell’s ‘new principle’ of taxation:” 721-38) disputed Elton’s
argument regarding more regular or peacetime/permanent supply during the Henrician period on the basis that Cromwell’s overtures for lay taxation from the Reformation Parliament onwards continued to be couched in terms of the doctrine of “necessity”, however
this is to miss the crucial point, made by Elton and subsequently Alsop (in “The theory and
practice:” 1-30), that the scope of a plea of “necessity” had been extended so far beyond
the scholastic understanding of a short-term defensive threat to a prince or principality so
as to render it effectively meaningless. In other words, by the early Tudor period scholastic
theory was being successfully misappropriated (as Richard III had unsuccessfully sought
during 1483-4) to sustain a “Renaissance” fiscal policy centred on more or less permanent
lay taxation within an expansive royal budget.
137 This conclusion has been reached by those working on rare surviving local material
from the late fifteenth century, admittedly emanating mainly from an urban context: Britnell, “Tax-collecting in Colchester:” 477-487. For more general comments, which stress
the paucity of central exchequer memoranda detailing the lay tax contributions of notable
county figures and which therefore suggest that by the close of the fifteenth century, the
upper echelons of county society had extricated themselves from lay tax payment to a large
extent, see Schofield, Taxation, 27-71.
138 For these points, see Hoyle, “War and public finance,” 75-99.
139 For Catesby’s appointment owing to his closeness to King Richard, see Wedgwood,
History of Parliament, 473. As Horrox (“Introduction”) states: “it is surprising that none
of the other county members was thought to combine experience and closeness to the
regime.” MPs’ willingness to endorse Catesby’s election thus appears as a by-product, at
least to an extent, of parliamentary gratitude towards an otherwise unpopular monarch.
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to govern collegially and not to browbeat his subjects. Such a
stance meant, however, that a significant proportion of MPs will
have represented the views and material interests of the southern
and midland elite which was at odds with the king. Clearly, in these
circumstances, any attempt on the part of the Ricardian regime to
extend an unwelcome parliamentary debate regarding lay taxation
by proroguing parliament, let alone to politically enforce lay taxation
against the wishes of parliament by threatening the Commons,
would have risked further alienating mainstream political society.140
Not only would this have negated the point of the fiscal, economic
and juridical “populism” to which Richard clearly aspired; it would
also have risked drawing the attention of contemporaries outside of
the House, many of whom already had a dim view of Richard’s rule,
to what was clearly an unpopular royal fiscal stance.141
Indeed, a potential parliamentary conflict or crisis over supply which
risked exacerbating contemporaries’ growing fears (whether justified
or not) of an emergent royal “tyranny” could even, at a push, have
threatened the king’s ability to have his Titulus Regius ratified in the
House. This was, admittedly, unlikely: as others have pointed out,
most subjects would have recognised their need to officially mandate
Richard’s rule as a prerequisite for the resumption of relatively
stable governance, irrelevant of their low opinions of Richard’s
140 This is exactly what had occurred during the so-called “Long Parliament” of 1444-7,
when Henry VI’s Chief Minister, William De La Pole, had refused to close parliament until
his desired lay taxes had been conceded; a fiscal stance which directly contributed to the
parliamentary and political crisis of 1449-50 which preceded the Wars of the Roses: Brayson, “The fiscal constitution,” 143-54.
141 Reading the chronicles of the period around the time of the 1484 parliament, it is
abundantly clear that literate elite contemporaries were aware of Richard’s desperate fiscal
position, although they seem unclear as to the measures taken by the regime to address
this. Attempts to improve the administration of the crown lands, discussed below, are mentioned, though The Crowland Chronicle Continuations (at 172-3) also talks ambiguously
of the king’s experimentation with alternative methods of raising revenue. This may have
been an allusion to the regime’s seeking of lay supply, which some outside of Westminster
may have heard rumours of, or it may be a reference to royal planning ahead of subsequent
attempts, discussed below, to raise large-scale loans as an alternative to the lay subsidy
which parliament was unwilling to concede.
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recent political behaviour.142 The king would nevertheless have been
unwilling to countenance any actions regarding lay taxation, or any
other policy, which may have risked parliament’s legally-required
rubber-stamping of his rule. In pandering, however, to MPs’ fiscal
conservatism the Ricardian regime ensured a continuation of the
financial problems discussed in the third and fourth sections of this
article. For since, by our estimation, balancing the regime’s books was
predicated on bringing in a fifteenth and tenth alongside the maltolt,
tonnage and poundage and clerical supply, the regime would have
been left – after the political community had conceded indirect and
clerical, but not lay, supply, and after a very small number of loans
had been contracted towards the end of the fiscal year 1483-4 – with
a deficit of around £18,048, as evidenced by Figure 3, below:143

142 Ross, Richard III, 185-6 sums up the prodigious literature on this subject. A dated
tradition of scholarship had played up the “democratic” connotations of political rhetoric,
in late 1483-4, regarding MPs’ ratification of Richard III’s royal title: Wilkinson, Fifteenth
Century, esp. 755-9; Dunham Jnr. and Wood, “The right to rule:” 755-9. As Ross points
out, such Whig-Liberal thinking prevented earlier scholars from appreciating the political
realities confronted by parliamentarians in 1484, irrelevant of their feelings towards Richard’s suspected actions in late 1483.
143 This owes to the fact that the regime’s receipt of the indirect tax increment provided
by parliament’s concession of the maltolt and tonnage and poundage, and its bringing in
of the tenth conceded by the southern convocation, would only have added £23,000 to the
public coffers. This sum needs to be added on to an apparent £2,152 worth of credit levied
towards the close of the fiscal year 1483-4, discussed in the text, below. When the resultant
£25,152 is placed in the context of the estimated deficit for 1483-4 in Figure 2, £43,200,
we are left with a deficit of £18,048. Apologies for the formatting irregularity in Figure 3;
the arrow and annotation denoting the fiscal deficit ought to appear in the gap between the
available income and total expenditure committments.
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As it became increasingly clear that MPs would under no
circumstances concede a lay tax to the Ricardian regime during the
course of the 1484 parliament, the king and his ministers would have
begun to plan their management of the royal finances in the absence
of lay taxation. The economic protectionism which characterised
Richard’s parliament may well have been promulgated partly in an
attempt to persuade MPs to concede lay taxation, as argued above;
but also partly with an eye to buttering up the domestic mercantile
community to provide generous loans, whether lay taxation was
available to underwrite these or not. This latter suggestion seems
to be borne out by the regime’s attempts, during the Easter term,
1484, to levy credit: the receipt rolls show that £2,152 worth of
loans were contracted from 22 individuals, mainly clerics and
figures associated with the Corporation of London and the Calais
Staple, after the parliament was concluded.144 This sum was around
144 T. N. A. E 401/950. As Figure 3 demonstrates, this sum made a negligible budgetary
impact.
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five times smaller than the large amounts habitually contracted, on
average per annum, by Edward IV.145 It could be argued that the
Ricardian regime secured more loans that we do not know about
by following the Edwardian precedent of by-passing the exchequer
and accounting for some of its loans directly through the chamber.146
This, however, seems extremely unlikely, in light both of Richard’s
low standing with a broad canvass of potential creditors and the
historically very low revenue base against which potential creditors
could be promised repayment.
In the absence, then, of massive loans which would have gone
some way to plugging the deficit postulated above, the Ricardian
regime, unlike its Edwardian predecessor, must have carried close
to £20,000 worth of debt into the period following the Easter term,
1484; a very heavy debt to have built up in such a short period of
time.147 Now, it needs to be pointed out that the crown would not
have attempted to fund this entire debt over the fiscal year 1484-5.
Historically, creditors who were owed money which initially proved
un-recoverable by assignment against public revenues whose yield
was insufficient to fund all the payments charged against them, had
the outstanding sum/s which the state still owed recorded in the
exchequer of receipt, as a “fictitious loan”.148 By recording unpaid
145 For an introduction to Edward IV’s credit activities, see Ross, Edward IV, 378-9.
146 For this administrative practice during Edward IV’s reign, see Lander, “The hundred
years’ war,” 233-4.
147 This is because, in the absence of the income required to fund the c. £18,048 deficit
discussed above, the state would have been forced to register its unpaid debts to royal
charges which had not been financed during 1483-4. For a discussion of the administrative
procedure of recording royal debts for future repayment in later medieval England and
likely developments in the royal management of debt during the Yorkist period, see the
discussion below, particularly in notes 148 and 149.
148 For classic discussions of “fictitious loans”, see Steel, Receipt, esp. xxi-xl; 407-417;
Harriss, “Fictitious loans:” 187-99. Historiographical debate between Steel and Harriss
centred on the extent to which the postponement of paying royal creditors by the administrative mechanism of a “fictitious loan” constituted a fiscal problem for later medieval governments. Harriss accepted Steel’s use of the volume of “fictitious loans” as a barometer
of the fiscal deficit at any given time, since this constituted the imbalance between public
revenue and expenditure and, when added to historic unpaid debts which, especially during
the Lancastrian era, were significant, this gives us the total government debt. He disagreed,
however, with Steel’s assertion that “fictitious loans” were, in and of themselves, a threat
to government stability. This could be the case, if the proportion of “fictitious loans” to
total assignments rose uncontrollably at a time of chronically low revenue such as occurred
during the late Lancastrian era. Most of the time, however, the state coped perfectly well
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debts fictitiously, as “loans”, the government was able to plan ahead
and re-assign debts against future revenue sources most likely to
yield the necessary cash.149 It was not uncommon, then, for as little
as a quarter of the “fictitious loans” incurred in one fiscal year –
essentially the royal debt accrued during that year – to be assigned
against prospective revenues the following year, since governments
sought to spread out the period over which repayment occurred in an
attempt to make the funding of debt more manageable.
Even if, however, the Ricardian regime had sought to fund as little
as £5,000 worth of the proposed 1483-4 deficit the following fiscal
year, this would have placed the regime in a very difficult financial
whilst incurring a proportionally small number of “fictitious loans” say 5-10% of total assignments, and whilst administering their reassignment well into the future.
149 The modern scholar ought to broadly accept Harriss’ corrections of Steel, which leads
us to the conclusion that, whilst it would have been perfectly normal of Richard III’s regime to incur a deficit, one as large as that which we have hypothesised for 1483-4 at a
time when lay taxation was not forthcoming constituted a very serious financial problem.
It needs to be pointed out that the deficit discussed above, which obviously corresponds to
the level of “fictitious loans” which we are envisaging was incurred, is a projection; it does
not derive from contemporary documentation. This owes to the paucity of Yorkist financial
documentation, which was detailed from the outset of this article, but which now requires
elaboration in the context specifically of “fictitious loans”. Steel (Receipt, 322-58) rightly
questioned the near disappearance of “fictitious loans” recorded on the receipt rolls by the
final decade of the Yorkist era. Viewed in the broader context of the dramatic contraction
in public revenue recorded by the exchequer during this time, he insightfully inferred the
operation of an alternative fiscal machinery outside the remit of the exchequer which, as we
have seen, Wolffe showed Edward IV to have brought into existence through his chamberbased “land revenue experiment”. Yet when Wolffe traced the operation of the Edwardian
chamber system, primarily through an examination of the demesne revenues which were
no longer managed through the exchequer during the third quarter of the fifteenth century,
he failed to consider the likelihood that the chamber did not merely manage a large proportion of the royal budget; but that it also managed the fiscal deficit and government debt.
Any such suggestion runs counter to the historiographical grain of studies (e.g. Lander,
Government and Community, 65-104) which contrast the “modern efficiency” of the chamber and its methods with the supposedly cumbersome practices of the “medieval exchequer”. Yet quite aside from the questionable validity of this kind of non-empirical thinking;
it also ignores the reality that, at a time of serious fiscal problems, the regime needed to find
a means of managing debt over time; it could not simply “write-off” its debts. Since studies (e.g. Alsop, “The structure of early Tudor finance”, 135-62) have shown that the early
Tudor chamber engaged in bookkeeping notations similar to “fictitious loans”, albeit on a
smaller scale than the later medieval exchequer, it makes sense to suggest that during the
Yorkist era, the chamber used this practice far more widely than was later the case under
Henry VII and Henry VIII; after all, the exchequer’s use of “fictitious loans” was the only
administrative model of debt management available to the Yorkists, so it follows that they
would have applied this within the chamber, though the complete absence of the Yorkist
chamber accounts means it is impossible to substantiate this logical suggestion.
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position. Such a debt overhang would have increased the “ordinary”
or permanent expenditure bill from £55-60,000 in 1483-4 to £6065,000 in 1484-5.150 What of “extraordinary” expenditures in
1484-5? The cost of preparing for an invasion and subsequently
deploying forces against Henry Tudor in 1485 was almost certainly
higher than the c. £5,000 discussed for 1483-4,151 however it is
equally possible that emergency expenditures on rewarding allies
and supporters dropped from the high level discussed above for
1483-4. Substantial land grants had already been made, as we have
seen, to Richard’s associates from confiscated lands in the aftermath
of Buckingham’s rebellion, therefore we can perhaps surmise that
the regime would have got away with holding emergency patronage
expenditures down to the level of the previous year after the largescale forfeitures had been taken into account: that is to say, an
estimated expenditure of between c. £12,000 and £22,000.152 On
the basis of these considerations, then, a conservative estimate of
c. £30-40,000 for total “extraordinary” expenditure in 1484-5, the
same as the previous year, seems to be in order.
We are left, then, with a conservative total royal expenditure
projection of somewhere in the region of £90,000 to £105,000 for
the final year of Richard III’s reign. Going into the fiscal year 1484-5,
however, the regime would not have expected a discernible increase
150 For the £55-60,000 expenditure projection for 1483-4, see note 55, above.
151 Emergency diplomatic efforts increased in the financial year 1484-5, as did the crown’s
attention to its sea defences and its apparently unprecedented investment in firearms as
well as in bringing specialist weaponsmiths to England to construct firearms in London;
all of which constituted failed attempts to prevent Henry VII from landing in England and
to neutralise the Tudor threat: Kendall, Richard III, 295-8; Ross, Richard III, 205; Richmond, ”English Naval power,’ 1-15, esp. 14. In the spring-summer of 1485, meanwhile,
the government despatPhed commissions of array and attempted to raise forces on mass to
repel the Tudor invasion. These were likely to have been the costliest special expeditionary
outlays of Richard III’s short reign by some measure, but it is incredibly difficult to even
very roughly estimate their total cost: Ross, Richard III, 207-9.
152 This owes to our earlier estimation of Richard III’s emergency patronage expenditures
during 1483-4 that were funded directly through the confiscations of autumn to spring
1483-4 as having stood at £13,000. It will be recalled that total emergency patronage expenditures during 1483-4 were estimated to have stood at between £25,000 and £35,000
(see above, note 52).
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in total royal revenue from the level discussed above for the previous
year. Indirect taxation could be hoped to yield at least what it had in
1483-4: c. £28,000; although this was of course dependent on trade
patterns.153 The crown could also expect the Canterbury convocation
to concede a tenth which, as noted above, could be expected to yield
£7,000.154 Cumulatively, these sources yielded £35,000. When these
sums are added together with available demesne revenue, which
we have suggested would have increased annually by £12-15,000
to c. £22-25,000 from 1483, we are left with a total income of c.
£57-60,000. Extrapolating from this, demesne receipts reserved for
the household, indirect taxation and clerical supply fell some £1520,000 short of increased total “ordinary” or permanent expenditures
postulated above for 1484-5. The c. £12-15,000 worth of demesne
revenues available to fund emergency patronage expenditures
to Richard’s supporters, meanwhile, fell well short of our c. £3040,000 conservative estimate for total “extraordinary” expenditure.
Drawing the above discussion together, it is clear that towards the
end of 1484, the regime would have been faced with a total deficit
of in the region of £33,000 to £45,000.155 On the basis of these
sums, Figure 4, below, hypothesises an average prospective deficit
of £39,000:

153 For the yields derived from the export trade, see Ormrod, “Revenues to the English
crown.” For a classic discussion of changing patterns of trade in the late fifteenth century,
which emphasises the relative stabilisation of the wool trade after the problems of the mid
fifteenth century, see Power, “The wool trade,” 39–90.
154 See above, note 60. A clerical tenth was conceded by the Canterbury convocation
between 10 February and 11 March, 1485: CFR, 1471-85, 307-10.
155 This prospective deficit is slightly lower than that provided in the third section, above
(which was calculated to demonstrate the parlous state of the crown’s finances prior to parliament and convocation sitting at the beginning of the fiscal year 1483-4) because, despite
the increase in total expenditure commitments in 1484-5, the regime received, from January 1484, the subsidies on trade which increased total indirect tax revenue substantially on
top of its securing of clerical supply.
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Indeed, since we have operated throughout on the basis of
conservative expenditure estimates and consequently prospective
deficits which are at the lower end of possible fiscal outcomes for
the regime, it is distinctly possible, if not likely, that the Ricardian
government’s financial situation was worse than we have envisaged.
A deficit above £40,000 would certainly be consonant with the
weight of contemporary or near contemporary comment regarding
the severity of Ricardian financial problems156 and, more importantly,
with the regime’s fiscal actions in its final months; to which we must
now turn. Firstly, it is very significant that the government continued
to seek the equivalent yield of a lay tax; that is to say, c. £30,000. The
B. L. Harleian M.S. 433 shows that this sum was sought via several
loan commissions which were despatched into the shires in February
and March 1485.157 Thus, the first commissions were issued on 21
156 See, for example, the comments of The Crowland Chronicle Continuations, 172-3.
157 What follows derives from the material published in B. L. Harleian M. S. 433, Volume
3, 128-33. Ramsay, Lancaster and York: Volume 2, 532-3 was the first (and only other
scholar, to my knowledge) to suggest that the yield of a lay subsidy was being sought by
the crown (Steel, Receipt, 320-1 discounts this hypothesis out of hand, without any explanation). Ramsay did not, however, draw from this the logical conclusion that, having failed
to secure an actual lay subsidy in early 1484, the Ricardian regime sought to bring in the
equivalent cash through levying a benevolence in all but name.
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February and contained between £9,000 and £10,000 worth of loan
requests. On 9 March, John Fitzherbert, the king’s remembrancer, was
tasked with approaching bishops and religious institutions for almost
£4,500 across the country. Later that same month, meanwhile, pairs
of commissioners were appointed per county, and were mandated
to raise various sums from local individuals who were sometimes
named, but oftentimes were not. The sum total being sought in these
later commissions was over £15,000.
Secondly, the loan commissions occurred soon after the Ricardian
regime attempted to improve the Edwardian system of chamber
finance by instigating important reforms during the autumn of 1484.
The B. L. Harleian M. S. 433 contains two financial memoranda
from October 1484 which were aimed at improving the fiscal
administration and consequently the yield of the crown lands.158 The
first and lengthier of the memoranda is entitled “A remembrance
made as well for the hasty levy of the king’s revenues growing of
all his possessions and hereditaments as for the profitable estate and
governance of the same possessions”. Its focus was on appointing
stewards of the crown lands with legal training; the idea being that
this would enhance “the king’s profit and the weal of his tenants”.
Wardships and temporalities, meanwhile, were to be kept in royal
hands rather than farmed. The second memoranda translates the
general guidelines of the remembrance into a more detailed guide
for local estate management. Thus, Sir Marmaduke Constable was
ordered to stop the tradition of Tutbury bailiffs farming their office
for a lump sum, and he was only permitted to sell suitable wood.
The same concern for detail characterised other royal instructions
to regional stewards: in November 1484 William Catesby was
authorised to sell wood from royal lands in More End Park to raise
money.159
158 For what follows, see B. L. Harleian M. S. 433, Volume 3, 116-20.
159 B. L. Harleian M. S. 433, Volume 2, 175.
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What of the regime’s hoped for yield from the crown lands following
on from the reforms in their administration discussed above? Henry
VII’s chamber accounts show the first Tudor monarch brought in a net
yield of c. £35,000 from the crown lands by the turn of the sixteenth
century; the result of a decade and a half of continuing deep-rooted
administrative improvement and the associated exploitation of
prerogative rights.160 We are therefore perhaps justified in suggesting
that the regime sought at least £10,000 over and above the £2225,000 worth of demesne revenues which we have seen the Ricardian
regime brought in. Viewed together with the £30,000 sought in the
regime’s credit operations, this substantiates our earlier suggestion
that the Ricardian government planned to finance a deficit of at least
£40,000 in the final year of Richard III’s reign. In the end, however,
the government only secured around £10,000 worth of credit over the
Michaelmas and Hilary terms, 1484-5; a mere third of its intended
yield from loans.161 This meant that, even if the regime did secure
up to £10,000 worth of additional chamber revenues from landed
and prerogative sources (which seems highly unlikely, since it is
surely a long shot to suppose that Richard achieved in one year what
his successor took over a decade to bring about), it would still have
ended up running a fiscal deficit of just under £20,000 in Richard’s
final year, as demonstrated by Figure 5, below (the brown bar at the
top of “Available income” indicates loans):
160 Dietz, English Government Finance, 84-5. See also Newton, “The king’s chamber:”
348-72. Wolffe (in “Henry VII’s land revenues:” 225-54, repr. with corrections in Royal
Demesne, 195-225) took Dietz and Newton to task for having wrongly interpreted the immediate increase in government revenues from Michaelmas 1485-6 as evidence of administrative innovation. Quite the opposite was, he showed, the case since the spike in income
received by the exchequer from the early months of Henry VII’s reign related to demesne
revenue received by the exchequer, and as such indicated to Wolffe the fossilisation of the
Edwardian “land revenue experiment”. Wolffe’s argument is broadly correct, though it was
less Edward IV’s fiscal methods which fell into abeyance; rather, what happened constituted a temporary demise of the Ricardian reforms which had formalised the Edwardian
system of chamber finance, as discussed below. It would take years of reconstruction and
reform to resurrect and improve the late Yorkist chamber system in the context of a new
centrally coordinated system of exchequer and chamber finance. Notwithstanding these
points, Dietz and Wolffe’s conclusions regarding the relative financial benefits of this resurrected system from the 1490s onwards stand.
161 T. N. A. E 401/951; T. N. A. E 401/955; T. N. A. E 401/950; T. N. A. E 401/952; T.
N. A. E 401/954.
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It remains for us to question why the government’s creditworthiness
was at such a low ebb, since to a large extent the failure of the
regime’s credit commissions underlay the substantial deficit outlined
above. The answer, as in our earlier discussion of the regime’s failure
to secure a lay tax in its negotiations with MPs, ultimately lies in
an understanding of the economic and, in particular, the political
context of Richard’s fiscal plans. The prospective economic burden
of the loans demanded by the commissions would likely have
caused tensions. Given the large sums required to bring the total
national yield up to the government’s desired c. £30,000, gentlemen
such as John Wingfield and Sir Edmund Bedingfield in East Anglia
alongside clerics such as the Archbishop of York and the Bishop of
Worcester were called upon to foot significant amounts; sometimes
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as high as several hundreds of pounds.162 This marked a significant
break from earlier loan commissions despatched into the counties;
Henry VI’s regime, for example, had been able to content itself with
seeking relatively small amounts of no more than a few thousand
pounds from its loan commissions because a small group of very
wealthy individuals and organisations politically committed to the
late Lancastrian government could be relied upon to contribute
tens of thousands of pounds.163 In contrast, such was the scale of
the 1484-5 commission that it took on the administrative character
of a direct tax which was particularly burdensome on the county
elite: none of the individuals named in the commissions belonged
to socio-demographic groups beneath the ranks of the yeomanry or,
more frequently, the local gentry such as the East Anglian knights
mentioned above.164
On balance, however, the regime’s ideological justification for the
loan commissions and the highly politicised manner in which the
Ricardian government administered these constituted the key factor
in ensuring Richard’s failure to secure sufficient loans to satisfy
his financial needs in 1484-5. Historically, loan commissions were
predicated on governments’ evocation of their wartime defensive
“necessity” even when, as during Henry VI’s time, a significant
proportion of the loans secured were expended on more permanent,
“ordinary” expenditures.165 In 1484-5, however, the Ricardian regime
deployed the same ideological argument as it had in seeking supply
at the parliament of 1484. Thus, the loan commissions stipulated
162 See, for example, B. L. Harleian M. S. 433, Volume 3, 128-33, which prints material
from Harl. 433 fos. 275v.-277v. All subsequent material relating to the 1485 loan commission is from this source. The current paragraph, and the two which follow it, are based
on a more detailed study of this commission, which the present author hopes to publish
elsewhere.
163 For the late Lancastrian government’s reliance on large-scale credit from wealthy
individuals and groups, see Fryde and Fryde, “Public credit,” 263-71; Harriss, Beaufort,
277-91; Davis and Peake, “Loans:” 165–72.
164 Earlier “forced loans” had targeted these same demographics, however the crucial
difference is that they had operated on a far smaller scale: Kleineke, “The commission de
mutuo faciendo:” 1-30.
165 Harriss, “Aids:” 8-13.
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that subjects were obligated to provide loans for the general needs of
the state as well as simply for the crown’s “extraordinary” defensive
needs.166 This marked a clear extension of the crown’s traditional
scholastic justification for loans which reflected the government’s
controversial attempts, discussed above, to normalise lay taxation.
As a result, contemporaries, many of whom we know already had
grave reservations about Richard following his seizure of the throne
and the political events of the summer and autumn of 1483, would
have been sceptical, to say the least, regarding the legitimacy of his
government’s call for credit, particularly on such a large scale.

The Ricardian regime’s politicised administration of the
commissions compounded their negative reception in the shires.
Richard to a large extent bypassed the traditional county gentry in
selecting loan commissioners; opting instead to appoint Ricardian
partisans or others who were largely outside the traditional upper
echelons of county society. Thus, Worcestershire, Warwickshire and
Leicestershire were committed to Walter Grant, a yeoman of the
queen’s chamber who had profited from the bonfire of confiscated
estates after Buckingham’s rebellion,167 and to Thomas Otter, who
as an ex-Neville retainer had close associations both with Richard
III himself and his wife’s family.168 Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire
and Derbyshire, meanwhile, were the responsibility of the
Ricardian loyalist Edmund Talbot of East Retford as well as a
relatively obscure Yorkshire squire named Stephen Hatfield.169
These examples demonstrate that Richard thought that deploying
his most trusted servants and “new men” wholly reliant on royal
166 The loan commissions of 1485 were framed as an appeal to subjects’ goodwill before
God to provide credit “for the defence and surety of the king”, as well as for the “weal
of this his realm”: B. L. Harleian M. S. 433, Volume 3, 128-33. This marked a linguistic
break from earlier commissions which simply demanded subjects’ contribution of loans in
response to the exigencies of “the defence of the realm” which, in ideological terms, underlay the scholastic link between credit, on the one hand, and defensive war and the special
expeditionary costs associated with it, on the other. For a discussion of these issues, in their
broader later medieval context, see Brayson, “The fiscal constitution”, 49-70.
167 CPR, 1476-85, 417.
168 CPR, 1476-85, 369; Ancient Deeds, Volume 6, no. C4115.
169 Horrox, “Richard III and the east Riding,” 87; 94.
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patronage would increase the commissions’ success.170 The exact
opposite was, however, true since the king’s brazen contravention
of established administrative norms centred on the appointment of
recognised senior local figures to loan commissions merely served
to exacerbate local anxiety and anger towards the king’s partisan
appointments to regional estates and offices. This is evidenced by
the long list of creditors who either extended lower levels of credit
than the sums sought by the commissions or, rather more seriously
from the regime’s perspective, who extended nothing at all.171 This
explains the fact that the government secured, in 1484-5, a far lower
sum total of loans than it sought.
Faced, in the credit debacle of 1484-5, with a fiscal political failure
on a par with the previous year’s parliamentary climb-down on lay
taxation, and a structural deficit of just under £20,000, Richard’s
final months were, in financial as in broader political terms, an
abysmal failure.172 Nothing sums this up more than some of his
supporters likely having to fund their own military contribution in
the ill-fated campaign against Henry Tudor;173 a striking example
of how, quite simply, royal funds could not sustain the Ricardian
government by this point in his reign. It does not follow, however,
170 This is a practice commonly associated with the reign of Henry VII, when key councillors such as Richard Empson and Edmund Dudley headed up county loan commissions:
Kleineke, “Morton’s fork:” 325-6; Gunn, New Men, 74.
171 Almost every individual for whom the sum which the regime approached them for is
known contributed significantly less. The general trend was for individuals to be asked for
a sum in pounds, which they contributed instead in marks. Thus, Roger Harecourt, asked
for £200, contributed 200 marks, whilst Roger Townsend, asked for £100, contributed 100
marks.
172 The best general account of Richard’s political troubles in 1484-5, aptly titled “the
collapse of the regime,” is found in Horrox, Richard III, 273-323.
173 As Horrox has convincingly argued (Richard III, 317-8), Richard’s most committed
supporters in July-August 1485 were the minority of Ricardian partisans who had supported his coup of summer 1483 and had benefited most from his rule. These individuals will
presumably have offered themselves and their retinues in the service of Richard without
seeking payment, since they had so much to lose in the event that Tudor won the throne, as
of course occurred. Some sense of the personal and territorial loyalties which were brought
to bear locally to ensure self-financed retinues were made available to Richard during the
Bosworth campaign is demonstrated by John Howard’s letter to John Paston asking the
latter, a prominent member of his affinity, to join him with as many men as he could at
Howard’s own cost: The Paston Letters: Volume 6, 85.
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that because Richard’s government’s fiscal strategy was politically
unsuccessful and resulted, effectively, in royal insolvency; there
were no administrative developments in the financial machinery of
English government during the late Yorkist era. The exact opposite
was in fact true, since it looks as though the Ricardian regime’s acute
fiscal political difficulties during 1484-5 made it more determined
to improve royal oversight over financial affairs in order to assist in
its ongoing efforts to raise loans, increase revenue from the crown
lands and, more generally, efficiently manage total revenues from
these and other sources to fund expenditures which had grown in
proportion with the debt carried over from the previous fiscal year.
In this context, we must return to the B. L. Harleian M. S. 433.
The remembrance included in this manuscript shows the Ricardian
government making plans to improve and formalise the chamber’s
accounting procedures.174 The new estate officials who we have seen
had been mandated to more efficiently administer the crown lands
were instructed to make annual declarations to the chamber. The
remembrance also insisted that exchequer auditors make a similar
declaration at the same time as their colleagues reporting to the
chamber, so that the king and his ministers were apprised of the
total revenues at their disposal and “what thereof is paid and what is
owing”. Viewed in tandem, these plans look like a blueprint for the
early Tudor development, during the reign of Henry VII, of separate
revenue courts in the chamber and the exchequer.175 These were
predicated on specialised and initially separate administrations very
174 For what follows, see B. L. Harleian M. S. 433, Volume 3, 116-20.
175 Henry VII’s reform of central financial administration is covered by Chrimes, Henry
VII, 119-134 (who provides a sensible overview); by Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 195-225
(who, as we have seen, stresses the early Tudor regime’s vigour in reforming the Yorkist
system of chamber finance and its yield); by Grummitt, “Henry VII:” 229-43 (who revises
upwards the chamber income brought in by Henry VII, on the basis of a reappraisal of the
surviving documentation); and by Alsop, “The exchequer in late medieval government,”
179-212; Alsop, “The structure of early Tudor finance,” 135-62; Jack and Schofield, “Four
early Tudor financial memoranda:” 189-206; Horowitz, “An early-Tudor teller’s book:”
103-16; Guy, “A conciliar court of audit at work:” 289-95 (all of which demonstrate the exchequer’s improved cash flow; its increasingly sophisticated internal auditing procedures
and record-keeping; and its preparation of annual budgetary statements covering total royal
incomes and expenditures from the end of Henry VII’s reign onwards).
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similar to those detailed in the 1484 remembrance for dealing with
the crown’s “private” and “public” revenues, respectively, under the
auspices of a crown and council which planned national expenditures
from a detailed knowledge of the intricately connected chamber and
exchequer systems; which were eventually brought under reformed
exchequer control.176
It may in fact be that this “early modern” fiscal system was already
being implemented, to a fairly advanced degree, by the close of
Richard III’s reign. Thanks to Wolffe’s thorough discussion of
the small number of so-called “foreign” or extra-exchequer audits
surviving for Edward IV’s reign in T. N. A. Special Collections
Ministers Accounts, we are aware of the yield of particular estates
administered through the chamber for this earlier period, yet it is
difficult to avoid the conclusion that the first Yorkist monarch’s “land
revenue experiment” was a rather informal endeavour.177 During
Edward IV’s reign there was, for example, no centrally-recorded
administrative guidelines for the running of the chamber system and
its relationship with the exchequer, nor can we detect a paper trail of
administrative changes within this system. In contrast to this, what
we see in the financial year 1484-5 is not only a formalisation of the
chamber’s financial role in the remembrance discussed above, but
also organisational changes in the exchequer. Thus, the memoranda
rolls record that one John Hayes, the receiver of the Warwick lands,
176 This followed on from the increasing speciality of the fiscal system developing out of
the chamber, in particular as far as the court of augmentations was concerned, which developed to manage the massive increase in landed income which followed on from the Tudor
regime’s seizure of the monastic lands. After Cromwell’s downfall, Sir William Paulet
worked to bring the whole convoluted chamber apparatus back within the remit of a much
more efficient, modernised exchequer: Elton, Tudor Revolution, 223. The key point which
is obfuscated by Elton’s focus on the Cromwell era, however, is that earlier reforms to the
machinery of the exchequer and its management of cash and emergent budgetary function,
which are described in brief with reference to important scholarship in note 175, above,
permitted the exchequer to take on this overall directive role in national finance.
177 Wolffe, Royal Demesne, 158-68, esp. at 163-4. Wolffe believed, without any empirical
justification, that Richard III’s memorandum of 1484, discussed above, suggests the prior
operation of similar fiscal administrative procedures, yet if this were the case, then surely
more chamber financial documentation would have survived for this earlier period. More
importantly, if such advanced financial planning was in place during the 1460s and 1470s,
then why would the Ricardian regime have needed to affirm the “Remembrance”?

Quidditas 40 (2019)

202

had paid £400 to the king’s own person in the royal chamber; an
effective declaration, on the part of the upper exchequer, of its
institutional separation from the chamber.178
Just as importantly, within months of the 1484 remembrance, the
lower exchequer began to use the tellers’ roll, which unlike the
ancient receipt and issue rolls listed receipts and expenditures on
one roll, in an important new way by totalling up termly incomes
and expenditures.179 Underlying this move we can detect structural
administrative change; it looks as though the receipt and issue rolls
(the latter of which we have seen had been recently discontinued),
which were increasingly unfit for purpose, had formally ceased to
be the dominant records of public revenues and expenditures; and
had been replaced instead by the one, simplified tellers’ roll which
provided officials with readier access to pertinent termly and annual
financial data.180 Following on from this, the increased importance
of the tellers’ role in the exchequer’s record keeping from 1485
demonstrates that it was from this point onwards that the exchequer
began to prepare termly totals of revenues and issues; the essential
precondition of the treasurer and under treasurer preparing an annual
“declaration of the state of the treasury”.181 This latter development
178 Dietz, English Government Finance, 1485-1558, 67, note 17.
179 e.g. T. N. A. E 405/86 m. 11. This marked the origins of the so-called “pen and ink dots
system” indicative of marginal exchequer auditing calculations, which were the crucial
precondition of the exchequer’s move towards preparing an internal annual departmental
audit (see below, note 180).
180 These changes are drawn attention to, during the Easter term, 1485, by the treasurer
and under-treasurer obtaining over £400 to pay the expenses of various crown servants
from the tellers: T. N. A. E 405/74. There has been some speculation that these changes had
begun in earnest during the reign of Edward IV (Alsop, “The exchequer in late medieval
government”, 184-5), but again, the evidence does not bear this out. Alsop relies on evidence from the post-readeption period when Edward IV filled the tellerships with figures
unusually close to his court, yet this was most likely an attempt to augment exchequer revenues and consolidate the first Yorkist monarch’s political position (Steel, Receipt, 297-8)
rather than an institutional reform of the exchequer’s operative procedures. Indeed, the
work of Edward IV’s new tellers was not recorded in Edward IV’s “Black Book” and most
of these figures quickly vacated their roles: T. N. A. E 36/266, f 50v.; T. N. A. E 405/58.
181 As discussed above, in notes 179 and 180, the tellers were clearly working towards
annual audits, or at the very least institutionalised budgetary statements, by 1485, yet the
first surviving audit detailing receipts, expenditures and left over cash by the tellers as such
comes from 1490: T. N. A. E 36/124.
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was not, as F. C. Dietz showed, institutionally regularised until
the early sixteenth century,182 but the point is that the Ricardian
administrative reforms clearly envisaged institutionalised exchequer
budgeting.
The points raised in the previous three paragraphs have implications
for historians of early modern English financial administration.
Firstly, they confirm that late Yorkist royal administrators, unlike
Wolffe and historians influenced by his research, were very well
aware of the serious financial limitations of the “land revenue
experiment” and that, as a result, they set about planning and
beginning to instigate deep-reaching administrative reforms centred
on royal coordination of a national financial system which was
predicated on both a reformed exchequer and chamber in an attempt
to improve royal solvency. Secondly, an appreciation of the fiscal
administrative vigour of the Ricardian regime calls into question a
strong trend in early modern scholarship which argues that Henry
VII’s financial administration marked a fundamental break with that
of his Yorkist predecessor.183 This line of thought is predicated on the
misguided belief, inherited from G. R. Elton, that Yorkist chamber
finance constituted a return to “‘traditional” personal government
after the exchequer’s bureaucratic “takeover” during the Lancastrian
era, and that Henry VII’s structural reforms to both chamber finance
and the exchequer therefore marked a decisive break with the Middle
Ages.184
182 Dietz, English Government Finance, 76-77, note 38. For the development of the system of auditing in the later years of Henry VII’s reign, see Guy, “A conciliar court of audit
at work:” 289-95.
183 This was the argument of Elton, Tudor Revolution, 20-30. Influenced by Lander’s
unpublished thesis, Elton believed that Henry VII’s reforms, which were built upon by
Cromwell, established an institutionally developed chamber system which was more effectively coordinated, through the royal council, with the exchequer than its late fifteenth-century predecessor had been. Based largely on the research of Wolffe, late medievalists have
tended instead to stress the continuity between Yorkist and early Tudor financial administration. As we have, however, seen, Wolffe’s thesis is based on an empirically unfounded
focus on the institutional strength of Edward IV’s “land revenue experiment”, which appears not to have been formally coordinated on a central level in the manner mapped out
by the financial administrative blueprint of Richard III’s reign.
184 These points echo those of Harriss, “A revolution in Tudor history?:” 8-39.
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Medievalists have long known that the exchequer was the coordinating
organ within national finance from at least the thirteenth century.
Important research by M. C. Prestwich and Harriss demonstrated
that even a king such as Edward I – whose military activities and
expenditures in his final years seriously strained the exchequer’s
logistical ability to keep track of and manage total income and
expenditure – did not institutionally challenge the exchequer’s
coordinating role within national financial administration.185 The
Edwardian “land revenue experiment”’ was fundamentally different
since, as we have seen, the exchequer from the 1460s onwards lost
its institutional oversight over a significant proportion of the royal
budget accounted for through the chamber (though, as the Longleat
manuscript shows, the Ricardian regime at its inception was able
to engage in financial planning through the council’s examination
of chamber and exchequer records). Since Richard’s regime clearly
played a formative role in improving and formalising royal oversight
of the chamber and modernising the exchequer, it follows that there
was no difference in intent between the financial administration of
the Ricardian and early Tudor regimes. It was only the scale of
the latter’s reforms which was greater; an achievement which owed
simply to the Tudors’ political success in establishing a dynasty
which survived.186
185 Harriss, King, Parliament, 208-28; Prestwich, “Exchequer:” 1-10. It is true that, following on from Edward I’s death his son’s alienation from key baronial figures made it
expedient for the king’s wardrobe to directly receive cash not channelled through the exchequer. The works cited above, however, demonstrate how little such sums were; the
wardrobe continued to rely on the exchequer for a majority of its revenues. Even in the
particularly chaotic period 1307-11, the exchequer financed a considerable proportion of
wardrobe funds and, crucially, maintained the bookkeeping fiction that an overwhelming
proportion of wardrobe receipts and expenditures were directed through the exchequer. It
is therefore necessary – contra recent scholars such as Grummitt and Lassalmonie, “Public
finance<” 144-5 – to stress the fundamental structural difference between, on the one hand,
the financial activities of the early fourteenth-century wardrobe within a strained system
of exchequer finance reformed by the subsequent Walton Ordinances and, on the other,
the Yorkist chamber’s “land revenue experiment” which was improved and formalised by
Richard III and which, for a time, witnessed the chamber administer a large chunk of the
royal budget.
186 This point is made more generally, with regard to the early Tudors’ restoration of
political stability, by Horowitz, “Richard III and Henry VII,”’ 1-20.
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6. Conclusions
Drawing the foregoing study to a close, five principal conclusions
present themselves. The first relates to the long-term constraints of
the Edwardian “land revenue experiment”. Yorkist royal finance, or
more specifically Edward IV’s system of administering augmented
demesne revenues through his chamber, was neither as stable nor
as sustainable a fiscal system as Wolffe believed. Surprisingly for
a student of McFarlane, himself a fiscal historian by training,187
Wolffe’s interpretation rested entirely on a massive, unquantified
exaggeration of the role played by landed income managed through
the chamber in the royal budget. A more detailed elaboration of
Ross’ method of taking late Lancastrian exchequer revenue and
expenditure data and, with necessary adjustments for changed
financial circumstances, applying this to the Yorkist period, has
shown just how shaky the foundations of Edward IV’s fiscal policy
were; the first Yorkist monarch’s solvency rested mainly, not on the
crown lands, but rather on his good fortune in receiving the French
pension and bringing in buoyant indirect tax revenues. When, in
1483, the French pension ceased and, on Edward’s death, the
subsidies on trade ran out, Richard III, first as protector and then
as king, faced a fiscal crisis which shaped his adoption of a very
different approach to running the government’s finances.
These observations lead directly on to a second conclusion; namely
that the Ricardian regime on its inception had no choice, faced with
an estimated deficit of c. £43,200, but to contravene the politically
hegemonic contemporary fiscal maxim that maximised landed
revenues administered through the chamber ought to broadly service
the crown’s financial needs. Richard’s government instead, as we
have seen, sought lay taxation to service the general needs of the
state, since this, alongside the expected, dependable renewal of the
187 McFarlane’s early work, based on his postgraduate research, was on the loans of Cardinal Beaufort to the late Lancastrian government (see, in particular, his “Loans to Lancastrian kings”, 55-78); a fact often obscured by his later and much better known research on
“bastard feudalism” and the Wars of the Roses. Wolffe dedicated his magnum opus, Royal
Demesne, to the memory of McFarlane.
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indirect subsidies and clerical supply by parliament and convocation,
respectively, constituted the only viable solution to the serious
financial predicament in which the regime found itself. Ricardian
financial planning, as evidenced by the Longleat manuscript
which emphasised chronically low anticipated revenues during the
protectorship and Richard’s early days as king, goes some way to
substantiate this claim. As does the broader fiscal political context
in which the regime undertook its financial planning. Chancellor
Russell’s preparations for, and his eventual delivery of, an opening
parliamentary statement which explicitly stressed the regime’s
general financial difficulties and subjects’ obligation to address
these, viewed in the context of the clear effort made by Richard’s
government to collegially deal with the Commons on a range of
fiscal, economic and more general issues of concern to county
society, provides evidence that the government sought lay supply.
The third conclusion relates to why the Ricardian fiscal plan of
1483-4 failed. We have seen that, on one level, Richard’s failure
to secure lay taxation could be considered ideological; that is
to say, his government’s call for what amounted to permanent or
near permanent lay supply ran contrary not only to the anti-tax
populism advocated by Fortescue and institutionalised by Edward
IV’s “land revenue experiment”; but also to the central tenets of
scholastic economic theory. Nevertheless, the political success of
the subsequent early Tudor regime, in improved macroeconomic
conditions, in beginning to expand the scope of the doctrine of
“necessity” to include expansive public costs unrelated to shortterm special expeditionary exigencies demonstrates that the
scholastic constraints of public finance were not unsurmountable;
that a so-called “Renaissance” fiscal policy was viable. This tells us
that the Ricardian regime’s fundamental fiscal weakness emanated
from the circumstances in which Richard became king; specifically,
the distrust felt by a large proportion of political society towards a
usurper suspected of regicide who stood no chance of persuading
MPs and their constituents to accept a new politico-constitutional
dispensation on lay taxation. It is in this context that we must view
MPs’ fiscal conservatism at the parliament of 1484.
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The fourth conclusion relates to the impact of the Ricardian regime’s
failure to secure lay taxation in 1484 on royal solvency, fiscal policy
and financial administration during the final year of the reign. By
our estimation, the absence of a single fifteenth and tenth in the
royal budget after MPs’ customary concession of the subsidies of
trade and convocation’s similarly customary concession of a clerical
tenth would have resulted in the regime running an estimated deficit
of around £18,048 in 1483-4. We have seen how this caused royal
expenditures to increase in 1484-5, as the regime would have
been customarily obligated to attempt to fund a proportion of this
deficit, whilst royal income remained broadly the same; hence our
estimated deficit of c. £40,000 going into the fiscal year 1484-5.
This explains the desperate expedients of 1484-5; firstly, Richard’s
attempts to instigate nationwide loan commissions capable of
yielding c. £30,000 – a public tax in all but name; and secondly
his modernisation of the crown lands’ administration. The failure
of these measures to yield what the crown required explains our
final estimated deficit, of c. £20,000; which takes into consideration
income from the loans and a (generous) estimation of potential net
income from the demesne reforms. Crucially, it was the regime’s
fiscal political straitjacket which underlay its plans to reorganise
national financial administration, specifically its rationalisation and
formalisation of the roles of the exchequer and the chamber which,
contrary to common belief, Richard’s regime began to implement.
The final, and perhaps the most important, conclusion concerns the
broader implications of our study for historians’ understanding of
long-term trends in the development of the early English fiscal state.
At the outset, we strove to situate Richard III’s financial difficulties
in the context of Ormrod and Bonney’s “new” fiscal scholarship.
These writers argued that early “tax states” predicated on regular,
profitable public taxation were able to sustain credit structures and an
explosion in expenditures in a way which medieval “domain states”
based on princely and prerogative incomes were not.188 For later
188 Bonney and Ormrod, “Introduction,” 1-23.
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medieval England, Ormrod showed how the mid-fourteenth century
regime of Edward III created a heavy-spending “tax state” on the
back of a booming export trade which resulted in a record indirect
tax take; and regular lay taxes which were sought and, relatively
un-controversially, granted during the first phase of the Hundred
Years’ War.189 Ormrod argued that the later medieval English “tax
state” became a victim of its own early success; the domestic elite
which held the purse strings proved itself to be very resistant, over
time, to royal political efforts to restructure operative tax systems.190
Consequently, successive regimes struggled to bring in the requisite
parliamentary tax revenues to fund heavy permanent and military
financial commitments; fiscal crises characterised by deficits and
heavy debts, rather than so-called “self-sustained growth”, became
the norm;191 and a “tax state” came to be replaced during the Yorkist
era by a low yield “domain state” managed by the monarch in his
chamber in an attempt to maximise limited funds within the context
of a fiscal state which had contracted dramatically in scope.192
Viewing Ricardian fiscal policy and late Yorkist government finance,
more generally, against a backdrop of later medieval developments
makes it very difficult not to conclude that, although the “land revenue
experiment” was an interesting and even a politically necessary
phase in government finance, it ultimately constituted an aberration
as far as longue-duree developments in pre-modern English public
finance are concerned. There is no better way to exemplify this point
than by viewing the fiscal deficits with which we have proposed the
Ricardian regime grappled in the context of the comparatively huge
public tax revenues brought in by Edward III’s government.
189 Ormrod, “England in the middle ages,”,30-2. See also the detailed focus on the fiscal
burden during the first phase of the Hundred Years’ War in Ormrod, “The crown and the
English economy,” 149-183.
190 Ormrod, “England in the middle ages,” 33 and Ormrod, “Finance and trade,” 186.
191 For Henry IV’s struggle to secure the necessary public taxation to remain solvent, see
the account by Given-Wilson, Henry IV, 280-301. For the situation under Henry VI, see
the various works of Harriss and Brayson cited in this article.
192 For a general overview of these themes, see Ormrod, “England in the middle ages,”
33 and Ormrod, “The west European monarchies,” 149-51.
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Had Richard’s government accessed as little as half of the
parliamentary tax revenue available to Edward III, we would be
discussing the final Yorkist’s striking political success in running
a large fiscal surplus; instead of the abasement of the government’s
finances under his rule. This observation chimes with P. K. O’Brien
and P. A. Hunt’s suggestion that a key requirement of the English
state at the dawn of the early modern era was that the Tudors succeed
in politically normalising lay taxation, alongside a stable export
trade and a continued focus on efficient financial administration.193
These developments, combined, served as crucial preconditions
for a piecemeal renewal of the English “tax state”. Viewed in this
context, the Ricardian regime’s failure – despite its overseeing of
key developments in financial administration – to secure lay taxation
in 1484, should be seen as a final chapter in the troubled relationship
between successive later medieval regimes and parliament over the
vexed issue of permanent lay supply.194

193 O’Brien and Hunt, “The rise of a fiscal state in England:” 165-9. These authors played
down the scale of the early Tudor fiscal achievement, believing it to have been largely
negated by the great inflation of the sixteenth century. This is to gloss over the fact that the
regime of Henry VII’s later years brought in well over double the royal funds raised by the
late Yorkist regime with which we have been primarily concerned.
194 This comment is premised on the well-evidenced observation discussed above (see, in
particular, note 136) that, from the early Tudor period onwards, governments were able to
secure permanent or near-permanent “peacetime” lay supply in such a way which rendered
the scholastic doctrine of “necessity” redundant, since a necessitas regni was being extended well beyond its medieval meaning to include a whole range of diplomatic, standing
defence and permanent charges on the basis that these were necessary for the utilitas regni
or res publica. Harriss therefore missed the point when he argued (in “Medieval doctrines,”
73-103) that, because much of early seventeenth-century fiscal rhetoric continued to be
couched in scholastic terms, politicians of the Civil War era continued to judge the crown’s
case for supply in terms of whether or not there existed a genuine state of defensive emergency. By this point in time the doctrine of “necessity” had long since become a watchword
for the regular and generalised financial needs of the commonwealth. It was not, therefore,
primarily the ideological basis of the early Stuart state’s fiscal demands which provoked
protracted opposition, but rather the political context in which James I and Charles I approached MPs and the elite; a different issue altogether.
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